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THE THREE OR FOUR APPROACHES TO FINANCIAL REGULATION:
A CAUTIONARY ANALYSIS AGAINST EXUBERANCE IN CRISIS RESPONSE
Lawrence A. Cunningham* & David Zaring**
INTRODUCTION
First the financial markets collapsed, and second came massive government intervention
designed to address the collapse. The third part of any financial crisis is reform. Judging by the
exuberant production of scores of ambitious alternative visions for financial regulation reform,
one may expect unprecedented reform in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis.1 In considering what
reform should look like, we caution that the headlong rush to do something should not neglect
the surprisingly good things about the old system or ignore the considerable reform that has
already been achieved by the federal government’s massive and unorthodox response to crisis.
Among the bewildering proliferation of alternatives, one, offered by Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson shortly after the failure of the first of many institutions in March 2008, boldly
imagined a revolution in financial regulation.2 After it, other recommendations poured in, each
with their own revolutionary visions of financial regulation reform, including two by an
organization of financial industry notables led by Paul Volcker, the Group of Thirty.3 Other
grand visions come from the Government Accountability Office,4 the Consumer Federation,5 the
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1
Some say that if this crisis “fails to do the trick, then there is little hope Washington will ever summon the will to
reorganize its creaking, disjointed system of financial regulation.” Now or Never for Financial Watchdogs ShakeUp, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSTRE49S6PD20081029.
Others say “we don’t have to start from scratch on regulatory reform of the financial services industry: There’s
already a sensible blueprint for change.” Editorial, A Starting Point for Regulatory Reform, MINN. STAR TRIB.
(Sept. 20, 2008), available at http://www.startribune.com/opinion/editorials/28668184.html?page=2&c=y.
2

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, A BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE
(March 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf [hereinafter, TREASURY
BLUEPRINT].
3

THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (Oct.
2008), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_fsi_banking_G30%20Final%20Report%2010-308.pdf [hereinafter VOLCKER I]; FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/pub_1460.htm [hereinafter VOLCKER II].
4

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING
PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM, GAO-09-216 (JAN. 2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf [hereinafter GAO FRAMEWORK].
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Congressional Oversight Panel created to oversee government interventions,6 plus a flurry of
reports by Washington think tanks, dis- or semi-interested observers, and blue ribbon panels.7
Not to be overlooked is the functional reform that government’s extensive intervention
created on the fly: reform, in essence, by deal, rather than by report. There also continue to be
good suggestions for reform of an incremental character, following the traditional US approach
to financial reform in response to crisis.8
These various visions of regulatory reform, including those that follow traditional
approaches, all stand a chance of enactment in the near term. The Treasury Secretary and
Federal Reserve Chair indicate desire for legislation and outline their own reform preferences,
informed by the proliferation of reports.9 Congress debates proposals, poised to enact reform.
And President Obama repeatedly calls for a new approach to financial regulation.10

5

MARK COOPER & BARBARA ROPER, REFORM OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE COLLAPSE OF MARKET
FUNDAMENTALISM
AND
THE
FIRST
STEPS
TO
REVITALIZE
THE
ECONOMY
(2009),
http://consumerfed.org/pdfs/FinancialMarketReformReport.pdf.
6

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009), http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.pdf.
7

Noel Sacasa, Preventing Future Crises: Priorities for Regulatory Reform after the Meltdown, FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT, Dec. 2008, 11; Luigi Zingales, A New Regulatory Framework, CITY JOURNAL (March 31, 2009),
http://www.city-journal.org/2009/eon0331lz.html; CHARLES CALOMIRIS, THE SUBPRIME TURMOIL: WHAT’S OLD,
WHAT’S NEW, AND WHAT’S NEXT (2008), http://www.williams.edu/Economics/seminars/Calomiris_10_02_08.pdf.;
STEPHANY GRIFFITH-JONES, PROPOSALS FOR REGULATORY REFORM (Investment Property Databank (IPD) Policy
Brief, 2008), http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/Proposals%20for%20Regulatory%20Principles.pdf; COMM. ON CAP.
MARKETS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REORGANIZING THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (Jan. 14, 2009)
http://www.capmktsreg.org
/pdfs/
CCMR%20%20Recommendations%20for%20Reorganizing%20the%20US%20Regulatory%20Structure.pdf; U.S. CHAMBER
CENTER FOR CAPITAL MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS, REGULATORY REFORM PRINCIPLES (Nov. 2008),
http://www.uschamber.com/assets/ccmc/081114ccmc_principles.pdf; INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE PROPOSAL FOR REGULATORY REFORM FOR THE U.S. MARKETS (2009),
http://www.ise.com/assets/files/about_ise/ISE_Proposal_for_US_Financial_Market_Regulatory_Reform.pdf;
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY REFORM: DISCUSSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_reg_reform.pdf; NEW DEMOCRAT COALITION, NEW
DEMOCRAT
COALITION
PRINCIPLES
FOR
FINANCIAL
REGULATORY
REFORM
(2009).
http://www.financialreformwatch.com/uploads/file/New%20Democrat%20Principles%20for%20Financial%20Regu
latory%20Reform.pdf.

8
E.g., Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safe, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008) (proposing a federal
Financial Product Safety Commission as a consolidated federal regulator akin to the Consumer Products Safety
Commission); John C. Coffee Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?,
95 VA. L. REV. ___ (2009) (concentrating on the Securities and Exchange Commission).

9
TREASURY OUTLINES FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY REFORM: PROVIDES NEW RULES OF THE ROAD, FOCUSES
FIRST ON CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISK (2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg72.html
10

Damian Paletta, U.S. to Toughen Finance Rules, WALL ST. J. (March 16, 2009), A1; BARAK OBAMA, REMARKS
THE
PRESIDENT
AFTER
REGULATORY
REFORM
MEETING
(Feb.
25,
2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-after-Regulatory-Reform-Meeting/.

BY

2


Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1399204



Amid the hurly-burly, how shall rational choices among this avalanche of ideas be
evaluated and made? In this Article, we try to organize the choices for the perplexed. Although
in details the reform proposals can vary enormously, at bottom, they reflect, we think, a few stark
choices. There is, in short, a vital difference between the large number of regulatory reform
proposals in circulation and the small number of functional regulatory reform choices actually
available. We think there are three or four options in approaching financial regulation. They
may be broken down into Democratic, Republican, old, and new—or, at least, events-driven—
alternatives, and each of these proposals has an exemplar.
We generate a picture of what financial regulation is or should be using a comparative
analysis of the old, pre-crisis regulatory system, often termed “creaky” or fragmented; the new
reformed system that government intervention created, a kind of de facto quasi-centralization;
and the proposals for planned reforms, especially Treasury’s blueprint, authored during a
Republican administration, and its Democratic alternative, contained in the Group of Thirty
reports. Both of these latter planned (and grand) visions prescribe formal centralization of
financial regulation, although, as we shall contend, for different reasons and with varying
implications. Of course, these solutions to our problems with financial oversight are more than
just alternatives. Each offers a vision of not just what can go wrong in our financial markets, but
what is valuable about them, along with a theory of regulation that either embraces or suspects
disinterested regulatory expertise and politically responsive governance.
First, for example, the pre-existing system, although often castigated, has its merits and
has long had its defenders. It is a highly fragmented set of regulators, distributing authority
between federal and state governments and across various agencies within both levels. The
system was disorganized but battle-tested and built out of repeated reforms, in a patchwork effort
not to repeat the mistakes of the last business cycle. It brought, at its best, creative, competitive,
and disaggregated oversight to the financial system. The advantages of such a system have been
praised by scholars for decades, including by Ralph Winter, Roberta Romano, Frank Easterbrook
and others.11
It is not, however, the system we currently have. A second approach to financial
regulation and reform is the developed-on-the-fly approach adopted by Secretary Paulson and
Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke during the crisis of 2008. This system developed from the
old, disaggregated approach, yet looks like its own model of a reformed, and centralized,
financial regulatory system. It puts the Federal Reserve, with its matchless ability to intervene in
the economy, at the fore of a financial regulatory system without many of the checks and
balances that administrative law usually provides.


11

E.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251 (1977); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); see also Henry N.
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1990); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA.
L. REV. 961 (2001); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225 (1985).
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The new crisis-driven approach amended the old system, not just in making the central
bank particularly central, but in changing the organization of financial institutions, shutting down
investment banks, and federalizing and nationalizing other firms. It shunted the Securities and
Exchange Commission to the side, and created a de facto hierarchy of banking regulators (the
Office of Thrift Supervision is at the bottom of that hierarchy, we expect). The form of financial
regulation that resulted is best described as ad hoc. Still, the processes it has put in place,
haphazardly, have adopted a centralized, unreviewable, emergency-based approach that has
added to the regulatory arsenal market intervention, nationalization and, above all, deals. It is
not only a model for financial regulatory reform; it is the model we currently have.
A third approach appears in several widely-circulating reports addressing financial
regulation reform, including Secretary Paulson’s blueprint released in March 2008. These
reports offer variations on a broad theme contemplating considerable consolidation of regulatory
oversight in the US federal government. The Treasury blueprint champions a version of the
“two-peaked” model, centralizing in the federal government two broad categories of overseers,
one focused on systemic stability and one on consumer and investor protection; in practice,
Treasury has pursued this centralization during the financial crisis.12 These proposals rationalize
and centralize authority to regulate markets—but then adopt a model of delegation to selfregulation within the industry. Because the Paulson blueprint was the first, most prominent, and
most detailed variant of these approaches, we highlight it to analyze this approach to financial
regulation.
Surprisingly close variations on the consolidation theme appear in reports offered by
others, including the Group of Thirty, headed by Paul Volcker, Chair of the Obama
Administration’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board. If Paulson’s blueprint represents the
view of the Republican financial establishment, the Volcker reports give the view of its
Democratic counterpart—Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, appointed by President Obama
to succeed Paulson, is a member of Volcker’s group. These visions are not entirely different,
and in practice, both Republicans and Democrats have embraced the on-the-fly model of
centralizing financial regulation in the Treasury and the Fed during the crisis. Indeed, Secretary
Geithner has done so explicitly, although he has adopted a consciously more transparent,
restrictive and control-oriented approach than his predecessor, Secretary Paulson.13
On the other hand, the Volcker group urges not only consolidation but prescribes more
stringent, substantive, reform, establishing size limitations on financial institutions and other
controls, such as limitations on proprietary securities trading by commercial banking


12

Notably, much of what is articulated in architectural detail in the blueprint, and especially the centralization, was
enacted on the fly by Secretary Paulson and the Federal Reserve Chairman during the 2008 crisis.
13

See, e.g., U.S. Treasury, Fact Sheet, Financial Stability Plan (Feb. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/fact-sheet.pdf (announcing continuation of government investment in
financial institutions’ preferred stock but boasting of new transparency of approach and stating firm limits on any
investee’s right to declare cash dividends on common stock, to use cash for acquisitions or to pay annual cash
compensation to executive officers in excess of $500,000).
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institutions.14 This sort of federalization follows a line of scholarship reaching from William
Cary to Lucian Bebchuk.15
Although the Paulson blueprint and Volcker reports both endorse consolidation of
financial regulation in the federal government, ending the traditional American fragmentary
system, they appear to do so for different reasons and with different visions for the
consequences. The blueprint promotes consolidation to enable U.S. capital markets and financial
firms to compete globally, where other nations offer their own regulatory systems and all
compete, in what is ultimately a competitive global stage. In contrast, the Volcker proposals
seek consolidation to stabilize and control American markets and firms and concurrently to join
other national regulators in similar regulatory control to maintain an ordered global financial
system. The Volcker approach is internationally collaborative, while Paulson’s is internationally
competitive. Even so, the consolidated approach endorsed by both Paulson and Volcker has
gained traction and an emerging consensus appears to extend regulation to new parts of the
financial services industry, including hedge funds, possibly private equity, and over-the-counter
derivatives.16
As we have suggested, we think that within these various approaches to financial
regulation, three or four models can be discerned. There is the decentralized old approach, the
on-the-fly reforms in 2008 that have transformed it—not trivially—and the more considered
centralized alternatives exemplified by Paulson’s Treasury Department and Volcker’s Group of
Thirty. They may stand in for other proposals that, we think, look like a reimagining of the
architecture of financial regulation from institutionally similar, but distinctively Democratic and
Republican, viewpoints. More than two and less than five, these alternative visions of financial
regulation are the approaches from which we will select our future system of finance.17
Which of these regulatory alternatives, then, should be preferred? As scrutiny of the
system of financial regulation reaches a new apogee, should we embrace the greener grass of
organized reform, or stick with one of the (arguably) two systems we currently have? If opting
for planned centralization, is Paulson’s or Volcker’s grand vision to be preferred?
This Article delineates these alternative approaches to financial regulation and provides a
framework to assess them. Some issues turn on questions well beyond law, including economic

14

Steve Vogel, Report Faults Financial Overnight, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/22/AR2009012201681.html. The GAO likewise
encourages greater consolidation of regulatory authority in particular branches of the federal government and opine
on characteristics that any refashioned US financial regulatory system should have. See GAO FRAMEWORK, supra
note ___, at ___.

15

E.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate
Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992).
16

The Treasury Secretary has testified before Congress on the need for “A Single Independent Regulator with
responsibility over Systemically Important Firms and Critical Payment and Settlement Systems.” Supra note 9.

17

Compare JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929 (1938) (cautiously reflecting upon the several
alternative approaches to financial regulation to diminish the frequency or magnitude of economic crises).
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theory, political science and international relations. Moreover, the alternatives confront a vast
swath of the US regulatory bureaucracy, essentially all aspects of its financial markets and
dozens of large regulatory organizations; the approaches bear considerable effects on the real
economy and present literally hundreds of discrete, and important, issues for decision. These
complexities, and the prospect of both many proposals and potential revolutionary change,
suggest the usefulness of having a framework for evaluation, which this Article provides.
Our most important normative conclusions are worth emphasizing at the outset. First, as
we have suggested, the pre-2008 crisis fragmented approach is a model in its own right, with
characteristic benefits, yet undoubtedly accompanied by flaws. Although debate about
regulatory reform may incline to elide these benefits, they have a considerable academic
pedigree that must be appreciated.
Second, there has already been considerable financial regulation reform amid the
government’s responses to the 2008 crisis. It is not as obvious as many appear to believe that
additional formal steps, and certainly not revolutionary, formal steps are appropriate. If
anything, it might be helpful to ratify the useful reformations to the system worked by the onthe-fly regulatory response and eliminate or reverse less desirable ones.
Third, although the approaches exemplified by the Paulson and Volcker proposals both
prescribe centralization to abandon fragmentation, they do so using different models, for
different reasons and with different objectives—both federalize and centralize, but then one
delegates to promote US global competitiveness whereas the other proposes to regulate, as
apolitically as possible, and collaborate with international counterparts.
Fourth, we think the fact that the principle regulatory reforms depend on a vision of
globalization is prudent. But we also believe that an approach that embraces the fact that both
finance and regulators can cross borders is more sustainable than one that does not. From both
domestic and global perspectives, therefore, the grand visions may simply be impracticable and
reliance on the traditions of ad hoc regulatory response all one should reasonably prescribe.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the prevailing models,
introducing first the traditional fragmented regulatory structure and illustrating its relatively
familiar method of responding to periodic crises on an ad hoc basis. It then studies federal
actions amid the 2008 crisis, which amounted both to ad hoc crisis response in the American
tradition, as well as its own model of regulatory reform. We also consider unusual aspects of the
tools used in the 2008 crisis, highlighting its response-by-mega-deal, and exploring the oddity
and utility of Treasury’s pre-crisis blueprint.
Part II examines the Treasury’s blueprint and Volcker proposals, and illustrates their
shared penchant for centralization of financial regulation. Examination reveals the subtle but
important differences in their motivations, the blueprint seeing globalization as a challenge to
meet with regulatory competition and the Volcker proposals seeing globalization as a solution to
regulatory limitations, worldwide, manifested in the 2008 crisis. Paulson seeks centralization in
order to promote US capital market competiveness, projecting the US into a regulatory
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competition with other systems. Volcker seeks centralization within the US, and coordination
among other nations, to promote order in global financial markets.
Part III considers these three or four approaches to financial regulation, and relates them
to the literature on administrative law and regulatory theory. It discerns procedural and
philosophical objectives of the Paulson and Volcker visions, the former vesting newly
consolidated federal power in the executive for deregulatory and competitive ends, the latter in
independent administrative agencies for re-regulatory and control-oriented ends.
Ultimately, neither grand vision may be sustainable. We may yet be left with remnants
of the traditional US fragmented system, as concentrated by the on-the-fly reforms made during
the 2008 crisis, with perhaps new regulations addressing certain financial instruments and
institutions previously outside federal regulatory purview. We evaluate the merits of this
approach as well, leading to our conclusion that incremental regulatory adjustments rather than
sweeping regulatory revolution are both superior and more practicable.
I. PREVAILING APPROACHES: DYNAMIC EVOLUTION
This Part examines the prevailing model of financial regulation through one or two
variants: the pre-2008 crisis model and the quasi-concentrated alternative that replaced it amid
federal government interventions in response to the crisis. In doing so, it offers something of a
history of financial regulation both before and during the crisis. Section A reviews US financial
regulation’s traditional fragmentary character and its redeployment to respond to past crises.
Section B discusses the 2008 crisis and the response to it, showing both a kinship to previous ad
hoc responses in genus, but not in species, and an unprecedented exercise of federal, mostly
executive branch, power. These are two related approaches to financial regulation.
Section C continues the historical inquiry by connecting the traditional fragmentation and
crisis response to the unusual nature of Treasury Secretary Paulson’s blueprint for regulatory
reform which, given its timing and scope, may be seen as both anticipatory and preemptive. It
exemplifies a species of financial regulation which rationalizes in an effort to ensure domestic
political control and international market competitiveness. It was issued ahead of the crisis both
to outline strategic and tactical responses to it and to lead and influence national reform
discussions that its authors may have anticipated as they foresaw the coming crisis. 18

18

A thumbnail sketch of the 2008 crisis may begin with the increased personal savings rate in Asian countries, in the
late 1990s, following stringent economic controls to correct the bursting of speculative asset bubbles there.
Resulting cash found its way into the US mortgage finance system, which was already expanding. Expansion arose
in part from low interest rates the Fed maintained to combat a recession threatened by the collapse of the US
technology bubble in 2000 and terrorist attacks of late 2001. Existing mortgage finance institutions, including
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, supported expansion by continuing to buy or guarantee mortgage loans. Expansion
was propelled by growing use of highly-rated mortgage-backed securities, pools of mortgages that pay interest and
principal to investors, sold through investment banks.
These forces led lenders to offer attractive deals to large numbers of borrowers lacking traditional indicia of
creditworthiness. Trillions of dollars of loans were made on easy terms, including loans not requiring a down
payment and low or no interest payments for initial periods, subject to reset at higher rates later. Reinforcing
expansion of easy credit were novel financial insurance products, called credit default swaps. These promised
investors in mortgage-backed securities, and other debt, repayment by an insurer if their own debtor defaulted.
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A. Traditional Fragmented Model and Ad Hoc Crisis Response
Traditional financial regulation in the U.S. is best characterized as fragmented, and a
fragmented approach is one model of financial regulation—indeed, it was the prevailing model
until 2008. Because the model has received a great deal of criticism, it is worth emphasizing its
values, chiefly innovation and regulatory discipline by providing a range of alternatives. The
model featured a multiplicity of regulators, some of whom competed against one another,
creating a market for law, and a crisis-driven evolutionary process.
In the old model, for example, insurance law is primarily state law; banking law is a
combination of state and federal law, depending on whether a bank is chartered by a state or at
federal level; securities regulation is primarily, but not exclusively, federal; and futures
regulation is entirely federal. Various other intermediaries, including government-sponsored
mortgage finance entities like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, fit awkwardly into the picture, and
were subject to special federal regulatory oversight, while mortgage origination itself was left to
state oversight. . The same is true of credit unions.
This fragmented system entailed roles for numerous actors, including state and federal
law makers, regulators, supervisors and administrators. In some fields, especially futures and to
a lesser extent securities, important regulatory determinations were delegated to self-regulatory
organizations, essentially industry groups charged with self-regulation. It was difficult for any
single authority to command knowledge of the entire financial system. But if regulators found it
difficult to evaluate systemic risk, the system, at least, knew what the regulators were up to. Most
regulatory production and supervision was conducted in accordance with open government
principles, meaning administrative law and procedure, such as notice and comment periods,
subject to accountability tools such as those appearing in the Administrative Procedure Act (or
state equivalents) and judicial review of legislative, executive and administrative action.19
The traditional system, conceived as a model of financial regulation, looked almost
irrational, but offered its share of advantages, such as a close fit between regulatory expertise and
targeted industries, a degree of devolution that enables exercise of state authority and
experimentation rather than monopolistic regulatory consolidation in Washington, and some
competition among regulators themselves.20
Overall, the system’s characteristic open
government promoted valued notions of democratic accountability and legitimacy. Moreover,

The result was rising home prices that became a speculative bubble. The bubble began to deflate in 2004.
Interest rates rose, sales slowed, lenders tightened standards and rating agencies identified greater risk in financial
instruments supporting the expansion. Large numbers of people defaulted on mortgage loans when their outstanding
balances exceeded a home’s market value. Cascade effects ensued: prices fell, mortgage defaults rose, mortgagebacked securities were impaired, capital contracted, and the effects rippled through all financial markets, eventually
infecting the real economy, triggering a steep recession. All these effects pulsed through the global financial
system, sparing no national economy.
19

See 5 U.S.C. 551, et seq.

20

Indeed, some observers have characterized the system as a law market. See LARRY RIBSTEIN & ERIN O’HARA,
THE LAW MARKET (2008).
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the various overlaps meant that regulators competed against one another for business. To be
sure, such a fragmented system resulted, at times, in both redundant and incomplete regulation.
Under it, some institutions were subject to more than one layer of regulation while some
transactions and institutions evaded regulation or oversight altogether.21
Moreover, the structure posed challenges concerning addressing periodic financial crises
that erupt. Financial regulators certainly perform vital quotidian tasks, such as ensuring the
safety and soundness of financial institutions, in addition to promoting fair treatment of
customers and investors. But they also must deal with occasional financial shocks. A fragmented
structure may enable authorities to respond to discrete institutional failures using tailored tools;
but it may also blind senior regulators to important systemic risks that lead to widespread crisis.
The question becomes the net value of disaggregation, an industry-by-industry focus, and
redundancy with gaps, or whether consolidation is likely to result in better regulatory
performance in crises, as by reducing their magnitude or duration.
Other scholars, along with many white papers and books, have described precisely how
this chaotic system works, and repeating their organizational charts and diagrams here would be
unproductive.22 Instead, it may be useful to offer four examples of how this structure has been
used to respond to, and at the same time how the structure has been changed by, past crises. 23
Although the exact response differed in each case, a familiar American crisis response
model of federal intervention appeared in each, along with the arguable failure of the system to
evaluate systemic risk. On the other hand, each crisis resulted from financial innovations that
were not—to be sure—unambiguously useful, but that illustrate the remarkable number of
market innovations over which the prior regime presided. In addition, the examples show smallscale versions of the kinds of crisis response tools that the Fed and Treasury deployed during the
crisis of 2008.
Consider first the widespread failure of savings and loan institutions during the 1980s.24
In brief, these institutions heavily financed the purchase of individual properties, including many
farms, at relatively high prices using relatively low interest rates. After a real estate boom turned
to bust, and property values fell while interest rates rose, borrowers defaulted in droves. A
downward spiral ensued. All savings and loans were affected and several thousand became
insolvent.

21

We provide more elaborate assessment and implications in Part III.

22

Readers wishing may consult GAO FRAMEWORK, supra note ___ or TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note ___.

23

For a partial list, see
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/business/07bailout.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin.

24

For an account of the RTC process, see Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 221, 247 (2000). For a more general overview of the S&L crisis, see Edward L. Rubin, Communing
with Disaster: What We Can Learn from the Jusen and the Savings and Loan Crises, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.
79, 79 (1997) .
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The government responded with a serial federal takeover of all those institutions, at a cost
of more than $100 billion, under the supervision of the Treasury in a Congressionally-created
special purpose authority called the Resolution Trust Corporation.25 It administered those
institutions by selling off their assets over a period of years. The response suggests a standard
outline of using federal apparatus to resolve national problems that plagued thousands of statebased or regional institutions that were largely not subject to federal oversight.
Similarly, the crisis led to reorganization of the S&L industry as well as abolishment of
existing regulatory bodies and replacement with new ones.26 The government’s reform could be
characterized as an industry reorganization: it turned thrifts into something that looked more like
banks and gave a parallel makeover to the thrift regulator, which was renamed the Office of
Thrift Supervision and placed within Treasury (it was formerly called the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board).27
Consider second the stock market break of October 1987, when the Dow Jones Industrial
Average dropped 22.6% on a single day and nearly 35% in the course of a month. Capital
markets shut down. Panic was prevalent as the volume of corporate transactions, ranging from
financings to mergers, fell. Financial innovations, such as computer-triggered block sales of
stock, and, again, regulatory gaps, were the story of the crisis. President Reagan formed a
working group to assess and advise on these matters.28 Here government’s reform was more
measured and technical; it took reflective, post-crisis advice, and then adopted a number of
“small ball” reform proposals.
President Reagan’s task force diagnosed causes, which it said were proliferation of new
financial instruments, such as financial derivative contracts, program trading and portfolio
insurance.29 Adopted reforms were pegged to specific stock market operations, like establishing
circuit breakers to halt market trading if stated declines occurred. Suggested reforms that were
not adopted include some appearing in 2008’s Treasury blueprint and the 2009 Volcker report,
such as reposing greater supervisory power over financial firms within the Fed and combining
aspects of securities and futures regulation.30
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Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
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26
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the Resolution Trust Corporation and Office of Thrift Supervision. Id. §§ 401, 501, 103 Stat. at 354, 364-94.
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See id.
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This President’s Working Group (PWG) is discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes ___-___.
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Third, consider the collapse of the large hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management, in
1997. Again financial innovation played a role in causing the crisis, although this one featured
the growth of an alternative asset class, rather than a liberalization of lending practices, or new
computerized trading techniques. Hedge funds were just beginning to reach the massive size
they achieved by 2008. And regulatory gaps appeared. Neither the SEC nor CFTC oversaw the
trades made by these funds.31
LTCM essentially placed side bets on the direction of various financial benchmarks, such
as currency exchanges and interest rates. The firm used fairly sophisticated risk management
tools and appears to have invested heavily in careful scrutiny of its positions.32 But due to a
financial crisis that swept across Asia, both currency rates and interest rates moved sharply in
directions LTCM had deemed highly improbable. As a result, the firm was exposed to losses on
hundreds of billions of dollars of trades.
Counterparties grew hesitant to deal with the firm, and the result was a rapid descent into
dire financial straits. But LTCM had obligations to many other participants in the markets, and
those participants had relied on those obligations. Seen to represent a pivotal component of the
financial system, the Fed, led by its New York office, orchestrated a takeover of LTCM by a
consortium of financial institutions, including Goldman Sachs.
No systemic regulatory innovations were taken in the failure’s wake, however, despite
increasing spread of financial derivatives and calls by some for enhanced oversight and
regulation of them.33 However, the President’s Working Group, descendant of President
Reagan’s post-1987 market crash task force, studied the crisis and resolved to strengthen
cooperation among regulators in the future.34
Although not a financial crisis, as such, the corporate accounting scandals of the early
2000s and regulatory responses contribute perspective on the traditional fragmented system and
pattern of crisis-response reform. Four large enterprises, mostly in the technology sector,
although one in the energy sector, used fiendish accounting shenanigans to create the illusion of

http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/10/regulatory-ru-1.html (describing the role of portfolio insurance in the 1987
stock market crash).
31

For an account of the various proposals to regulate hedge funds by a current SEC commissioner, see Troy A.
Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 975 (2006).
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See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED (2002).
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E.g., Thomas A. Russo, Financial Innovation and Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product
Development, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1431 (1991). Noted investor Warren Buffett famously quipped that derivatives had
become “financial weapons of mass destruction.” See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & WARREN E. BUFFETT, THE
ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 145 (2d ed. 2008).
34

See supra note __ and accompanying text.
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billions of dollars of value.35 These and dozens of other corporations were discovered as all but
(and in some cases total) frauds amid the collapse of the technology sector.
Here too, financial innovations increasingly popular elsewhere. Off-balance sheet special
purpose investment vehicles and various forms of aggressive accounting for financial
instruments appeared. Gaps in the division between state and federal oversight, and relatively
laissez-faire federal accounting oversight, were exploited.
The swift federal response was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, reform targeted mostly
at diagnosed causes of the frauds, plus a dozen remotely related provisions favored by various
political interests. The controversial legislation provoked criticism as an over-reaction to the
perceived crisis of investor confidence.36 Although most of its provisions remain in effect, some
implementing policies, especially concerning mandatory audits of corporate internal controls,
were scaled back considerably. Many observers cite Sarbanes-Oxley as illustrating the kind of
dangerous over-reaction that crisis-driven legislative and regulatory reform can pose.
These selected examples show some familiar traditional patterns of financial crisis and
response in the fragmented model. The crisis can bubble up in a particular sector—real estate
bank lending in the S&L crisis, equity market pricing in 1987’s stock market break, derivative
financial products in LTCM’s 1997 failure and technology in the early 2000’s accounting
scandals.37 They also show a substantially coordinated national response, led at the federal level,
usually based on ex post diagnostics of causes. Finally, they show that regulatory responses are
often tailored to the particulars of the problem, although many un-adopted proposals with greater
systemic scope often are made. In short, comprehensive reform of financial regulation has
usually required a crisis to develop, but a crisis does not always lead to comprehensive
regulatory reform.
B. On-the-Fly Reform Model in 2008 Crisis: Ad Hoc Centralization
The 2008 crisis bears kinship to predecessors, in several ways, but its scale and scope
were unprecedented. One of us has elsewhere provided a detailed account of how the
government responded to the crisis;38 here we consider its response as a model of regulatory
reform.

35

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might
Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915 (2003).
36

E.g., Roberta Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521
(2005).

37

Federal intervention to address problems of one or a few firms that could pose systemic ripple effects recurs.
Famous examples include addressing Penn Square bank, which threatened to topple Continental Illinois Bank, then
7th largest in the US, see Phillip L. Zweig, Learning Old Lessons from a New Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at
A19 (reviewing case in light of pending crisis at Enron Corporation), and Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI), an illicit international web of financial operations whose collapse threatened the financial
system’s stability, see United States v. BCCI Holdings, 69 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 1999).
38

See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Big Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis (draft
Jan. 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1306342.
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We posit the response as a reform model cautiously. Nobody said they were reforming
the financial system when they bailed out all those institutions, and it is easy to succumb to
recency bias when evaluating the momentousness of legal developments. Moreover, there are
some ways that the crisis evolved according to the usual playbook. But the response also
centralized financial regulation, even if sub silentio, and so turned away from the old approach to
financial regulation.
The response also dispensed with the usual trappings of administrative law in making
what turned out to be the government’s signature policy initiative during 2008 into something
done without notice, comment, judicial review, or, for much of its duration, authorizing
legislation. As we explain in what follows, the response changed the regulation of investment
and commercial banking, mortgage finance, and even insurance regulation, and coordinated that
change globally. Yet, despite all of this action, it still left essentially unregulated the financial
derivative instruments that some observers place at the root of the crisis.
Is the regulatory response to the 2008 crisis its own model of financial regulation? We
are agnostic, and invite this Article’s readers to decide. The following analysis should facilitate
evaluation.
As with past crises, the 2008 crisis spread quickly. The S&L crisis and the 1987 stock
market collapse exemplified the speed with which financial markets can turn from relatively safe
to extraordinarily risky. The 2008 crisis took on a momentum that accelerated rapidly, especially
in the final quarter of that year. As former Treasury Secretary Paulson wondered of the serial
collapse of financial institutions during that period: “[w]ho are these guys that just keep
coming?”39
The 2008 crisis also followed the financial crisis rulebook in response, at least in the
beginning. The response began with firm-by-firm intervention in the spring, summer, and early
fall of 2008,40 but ensuing efforts broadened to prevent asset prices from plunging.41 As with the
S&L and LTCM crises, federal authorities used deals (M&A and corporate finance) to respond.42
But, again given the scale, ultimate responses reached unprecedented levels, amounting to
regulatory intervention involving what is best described as regulation by deal.
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See Joe Nocera & Edmund L. Andrews, Struggling to Keep Up as the Crisis Raced On, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2008, at A1.

40

As discussed, infra, Bear Stearns in investment banking; Indy Mac, Washington Mutual and Wachovia in
commercial banking, AIG in insurance; and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in mortgage finance.
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Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. This Act envisioned Treasury buying up to $750 billion in
troubled assets using techniques such as reverse auctions to generate prices otherwise unformed amid distressed
market conditions. It was subsequently used as the basis for Treasury’s investment of $250 billion in preferred stock
and warrants of banks. See Steve Lohr, Bold Action With Basis in History, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2008).
42

See Davidoff & Zaring, Big Deal, supra note ___.
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On balance, then, the government did something entirely new in responding to the 2008
crisis, to the point of altering regulation of financial markets more generally. It provided
financial guarantees, bought preferred stock and warrants in private companies, extended
commercial loans to others, acted as broker of numerous mergers and takeovers of yet others,
took over some companies, in whole or in part, and made what amounted to business decisions to
participate in some corporate finance and M&A activity with certain companies while allowing
others simply to fail.43 The response paradigm was accordingly not unknown to the financial
system, but is distinguished by ad hoc deal-making out of the crisis, rather than post hoc reform
to calm troubled waters, as in previous crises.
The Fed and Treasury’s deal-making and injection of liquidity into capital markets forced
both to resort to the novel use of legal authority to justify their actions. And, given the scale of
responses, it was never clear that either had that authority.44 They did seek and obtain legislation
authorizing using up to $750 billion in Treasury funds to buy distressed assets and/or make
investments in banks on behalf of the US government.45 But they also relied extensively on
flexible Depression-era statutes to get involved in sectors of the economy in which they had
previously never had purchase, dramatized by how the Fed bought an insurer—AIG—and
Treasury became an insurer of money market funds.46
As with other financial crises, this one and the response to it prompted proposals for
large-scale, planned reform, including contributions made by groups and commentators ranging
from the Group of Thirty to the GAO.47 Ironically, however, in this case, some of the reforms
achieved by the Fed and Treasury were contemplated before the scale of crisis became clear, in
March 2008’s Treasury blueprint. For example, as we will detail, the blueprint counseled the
centralized model which the Fed adopted, with assistance from Treasury, during 2008 It advised
consolidating safety and soundness supervision in a single entity, and during the crisis, the Fed
took over supervision of investment banks from the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
blueprint urged a federalization of insurance, and the Fed responded with a takeover of AIG.
This is a new order. In our view, in the 2008 crisis, real, even lasting reforms to the
financial system were actually generated on the fly, as the government responded, rather than
after the response. True, the various strands of the crisis led to different responses by different
regulators. But by the end of 2008, the federal government’s extensive financial commitment
into nearly every financial services industry had substantially consolidated the various forms of
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See Charles Duhigg et al., As Crisis Grew, A Few Options Shrank to One, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2008).
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no. 1351987); on AIG, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout (March 10, 2009) (ssrn id no. 1346552).

47

See supra text accompanying notes 2-5 (citing sources).
14





financial regulation. It centralized regulatory authority in the Fed and Treasury, significantly
reducing regulatory authority of other federal agencies and state regulators.
Below we explore how the prevailing system of financial regulation shifted radically
during the 2008 crisis and responses to it. As we have said, the practice of investment banking
was essentially terminated, moving remaining investment banks from supervision by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to supervision by the Fed. The regulation of commercial
banking was extensively consolidated within the federal government, especially within the Fed
and Treasury. Federal supervision of mortgage finance shifted from independent federal
agencies to within the Fed and, especially, Treasury. Even some aspects of insurance regulation
shifted at least slightly from state to federal authorities. It is all new, and it has transformed our
formerly decentralized and fragmentary system into something quite different and novel.
1. Investment Banking. The 2008 crisis changed the face of investment banking
completely, and arguably ended it as a separate sort of finance, in what amounts to de facto
financial regulation reform. The industry was led by five large firms: Bear Stearns, Goldman
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley. Each of these firms during 2008
essentially failed as stand-alone institutions, with the result that all five ceased to be subject to
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and instead became subject to Fed
oversight.
Bear tripped first, in March 2008, after counterparties refused to offer short-term credit it
needed to run its business. In moves reminiscent of those applied to address the LTCM crisis in
1997, the Fed and Treasury orchestrated a merger of Bear with JP Morgan Chase, a commercial
bank, at an initial price per share of about $2—a price that holders promptly protested, getting it
raised within two weeks to $10 per share.48
In September 2008, an even worse fate befell Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, like
Bear Stearns, heavily exposed to the subprime mortgage market.49 The Fed and Treasury
elected not to sustain Lehman, though they helped to arrange for other financial institutions, like
Barclay’s, a British commercial bank, to assume many of its operations.50
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See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bearn Stearns, Delaware
and the Strategic Use of Comity (Aug. 11, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1254648.
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Evidence of its dire straits appeared in how Lehman was the only major defendant that refused to settle lawsuits
challenging the suitability for individuals of auction rate securities. These were portrayed as liquid cash equivalents
but their liquidity depended on investment banks willing to trade them, willingness that terminated amid the crisis
and left individuals holding securities they could not sell. See Gretchen Morgenson, As Good as Cash, Until It Is
Not, N.Y. TIMES (March 9, 2008).
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The effort to enlist Barclay’s was important to protect investors under securities laws designed to secure customer
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Acquisition by Barclays (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-206.htm.
15





During the same September week the Fed and Treasury signaled unwillingness to support
Lehman, they sent the same signal to Merrill Lynch.51 As a result, Merrill quickly merged with
Bank of America on the weekend that Lehman Brothers fell, in a deal likewise supported by the
Fed and Treasury. Within that week, moreover, also with the blessing of the Fed and Treasury,
Goldman and Morgan Stanley opted to turn themselves into bank holding companies under Fed
supervision and with expanded access to its liquidity facilities.52
These changes were momentous, not only because they were achieved as a result of
government decisions to provide or withhold support or to encourage or discourage particular
transactions. In many ways, it was these events, rather than the 1999 repeal of the GlassSteagall Act, that marked the real end of 75 years of separation of investment banking from
commercial banking in the United States. That separation was begun with enactment of the
Glass-Steagall Act, a Great Depression statute that established a legal wall that separated
commercial from investment banking.
Under the Glass-Steagall Act—itself an ad hoc response to that period’s financial crisis—
commercial banks would take deposits and make loans; investment banks would buy and sell
securities and engage in other transactional corporate finance.
Enterprises engaged in
commercial banking could not engage in investment banking. Most of that Act was repealed by
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, having gradually been chipped away with exemptions for
commercial banks to underwrite securities and investment banks to own commercial bank
subsidiaries. The partial repeal ended the legal limitations on combining these activities within
one firm.
Despite that repeal, there remained a large and recognizable group of firms that
epitomized traditional investment banking—Bear, Goldman, Lehman, Merrill, and Morgan
Stanley. After repeal, and until the cataclysmic events of 2008, the SEC had jurisdiction over
the safety and soundness of these firms, though its role in determining their fate would ultimately
be minimal. The SEC exercised its oversight through a voluntary program.53 The SEC
Chairman who created and oversaw that program admitted in September 2008 that it was a total
failure.54 With Lehman bankrupt, Bear and Merrill subsumed by commercial banking
institutions and Goldman and Morgan Stanley officially commercial bank holding companies,
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See Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement on Schedule Form 14A, at 49-50, Oct. 31, 2008,
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the regulatory landscape was radically, although haphazardly, reformed, on the fly, by the Fed
and Treasury.
2. Commercial Banking. Fed and Treasury activities during the 2008 crisis concerning
commercial banking followed a more traditional model, although also on an unprecedented scale,
and with the functional reform of concentrating regulatory authority in the Fed and Treasury.
US commercial banking was traditionally a dual system, created at state and federal levels,
although both subject to federal oversight. Three institutional categories prevailed: national
banks within the Federal Reserve system; national banks under supervision of the Comptroller of
Currency within Treasury; and state-chartered banks, either within the Federal Reserve system or
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
During the 2008 crisis, numerous commercial banks from within all three institutional
categories faced extraordinary liquidity challenges. Some became insolvent, failed and were
taken over by federal authorities or sold to larger banks in deals orchestrated by federal
authorities, especially the Fed and Treasury. Principal examples are Indy Mac (put under FDIC
supervision in July 2008),55 Washington Mutual (arranged sale to JP Morgan Chase in
September 2008)56 and Wachovia (arranged sale to Wells Fargo in October 2008).57 The Fed
and Treasury enlisted larger banks, including Bank of America, Barclays, Citicorp, JP Morgan
Chase and Wells Fargo, to provide safer homes for these and other failing institutions.
The Fed and Treasury also directly invested federal government funds in smaller and
larger banks alike, not only relying upon traditional lending, but buying equity positions, and not
only extending credit to commercial banks within their traditional purview, but to banks and
non-banks outside their traditional jurisdiction.58 All of this was done quickly, on an emergency
basis, and without the usual notice and comment that accompanies government rulemaking.
Indeed, during Secretary Paulson’s tenure, this was often done without any pre-action notice at
all and, despite a commitment to greater transparency, advance notice was not a feature of
Secretary Geithner’s program either.59
The Fed intervened in these events and transactions in two different ways: it provided
financial support to some firms seeking liquidity and provided advice and support for others for
whom merging operations was deemed superior. Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act creates
the liquidity mechanism, called the discount window, which had been used in the past to support
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troubled financial institutions, although not to the extent that it was used in 2008 to backstop
credit in commercial banking more generally. The relevant part of Section 13 provides:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by
the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal Reserve bank, . . . to
discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when
… indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank: Provided, That
before discounting . . . the Federal Reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual,
partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other
banking institutions. ….60

The Fed interpreted that Act to allow it to open its discount window not just to banks but
other institutions in emergencies.61 These on-the-fly regulatory exertions did not overrule the
system of dual banking in the United States, nor clearly reallocate authority within federal
agencies, but they did put the Fed in a far stronger regulatory position than it had identified with
historically. As a rule of thumb in administrative law, if an agency has never done something in
the past, it usually cannot do it, no matter how broad the grant of Depression era authority.62
But the dynamic paradigm of ad hoc centralization during 2008 allowed little time for quarrels
over such legal niceties.
3. Mortgage Finance. Treasury’s secondary mortgage market forays also seemed to
recalibrate the government approach to home ownership support through the process of a
government takeover. By June 2008, it became clear that financial weakness plagued two of the
most central participants in the US mortgage finance system,63 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
These government-sponsored entities (GSEs), created by Act of Congress but run as private
firms, were widely but incorrectly perceived as enjoying government guarantees.64
The GSEs were subject to oversight by a separate federal governmental authority but
enjoyed no such explicit government guarantees. Their principal business was buying or
guaranteeing home mortgages and repackaging them into securities to generate ongoing funding
to support the US housing market. These activities resulted in them owning or guaranteeing
more than half the multi-trillion dollars of outstanding US mortgage debt, including a large
portion that would default or become delinquent in the 2008 crisis.
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The steadily worsening weaknesses at Freddie and Fannie, however, induced Treasury to
intervene. It directed that they be put into a conservatorship.65 The intervention “stemmed from
a growing realization by Fed and Treasury officials that the two companies could not survive in
their existing forms, and that any collapse would be devastating to the economy.”66 The
intervention depended on hastily passed supervisory authority that the Treasury, and Fannie and
Freddie’s regulators, had promised Congress not to use.67 The Congressional authority, given on
July 30, 2008, provided the following:
The Director is authorized, . . . to make such determinations, take such actions, and perform such
functions as the Director determines necessary regarding . . . decisions to appoint conservators for
[Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae].68

Treasury used the ability to make these sorts of purchase and sales when it assumed
control over Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae beginning in late summer 2008. The conservator
power was new, but bankruptcies, of course, happened under the old regime. What differed was
the origin of the conservator—a government agency closely supervised by Treasury, and with a
long-term, rather than short-term, view. The Congressional delegation of authority to Treasury
to decide whether to seize the firms exemplified the centralization in 2008.
Fannie and Freddie had their own regulators who had little to do with the final
disposition of the institutions.69 Treasury’s intervention in mortgage finance thus represents
another part of the considerable financial regulation reform that occurred during the crisis of
2008.
4. Insurance. The on-the-fly centralization of 2008 even reached insurance. The day
after Lehman was allowed to fail, the Fed and Treasury intervened to buy or backstop the assets
of American International Group, a large insurance company that they had never regulated in the
past. AIG, subject to the jurisdiction of the New York State Insurance Department, ran sound
insurance businesses through various divisions worldwide. It also operated one division that
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underwrote a large volume of credit default swaps, essentially insurance against borrower default
on debt.70
Amid the 2008 crisis of borrower defaults that spread through the financial system, AIG’s
exposure on these reached staggering proportions that appeared to impair other parts of the
company.71 AIG’s New York State insurance overseer proved unable to come up with the
financing to backstop the company’s disastrous moves into credit default swaps and the
mortgage market.72 But, in the Fed’s judgment, an AIG failure would threaten the financial
system. As a result, the Fed opened its discount window for AIG, initially to lend it $85 billion,
with Treasury subsequently investing additional amounts in exchange for preferred stock that
represented a controlling interest in the company.73
The move was particularly notable because insurance law is primarily state law. It is, in
fact, quintessentially state law (and controversially so), as it is strongly insulated from federal
oversight and influence.74 The 2008 crisis gave federal authorities reason and opportunity to
revisit this arrangement. And, again, the imposition of the central bank into insurance
supervision was not only novel, such a trade of credit for equity was unprecedented in the Fed’s
use of Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act.75 Furthermore, numerous insurance companies
sought to convert themselves into savings and loan associations precisely to become subject to
the Fed’s jurisdiction (in terms of both supervision and access to funds).76
Of course, this is not to say that such regulatory reform was comprehensive. States retain
plenary authority over the creation and regulation of insurance companies in the United States.
Any efforts to alter that must await more planned and formal regulatory reform initiatives. But,
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there is also no doubt that these steps represented at least some important substantive steps in a
regulatory reform road.


5. Derivatives. One important contributor to the 2008 crisis managed to evade the
federal reform marked by the on-the-fly response to the crisis. The derivative business over
which financial institutions made their most disastrous risk calculations were credit default
swaps. AIG, for example, wrote a large book of business in the form of credit default swaps.
What doomed AIG were defaults and coverage on these, not its traditional insurance operations.
The credit default swaps it issued are like insurance contracts, which is presumably why AIG got
into the business. But the swaps are not like homeowner protection or D&O coverage. For a
fee, the insurer promises a lender to a third party that it would cover payments on the borrower’s
default. If larger than modeled defaults arise, as they did, this insurance program could wipe its
underwriter out. For AIG, it did.
Credit default swaps, and many other modern financial products, evade tidy
characterization within traditional classifications of financial devices. They could be classified
as insurance or securities or futures and therefore subject to state, SEC or CFTC regulation. In
fact, however, many of these devices were simply put beyond regulatory reach in the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000.77 Whether due to this statutory exemption or
general problems of classification and jurisdiction, it became clear that trillions of dollars in
notional amount of these products had been created without the kind of transparency, for markets
or regulatory authorities, that usually accompany financial instrument creation, trading and
settlement.78
Many diagnoses of the 2008 crisis identified as a culprit the regulatory gap that allowed
credit default swaps to evade supervision under insurance, securities and futures regulations. But
authorities in those fields abjured oversight. Little that the Fed or Treasury did addressed these
issues either, although the Fed’s intervention did guarantee a portion of AIG’s debt, providing at
least some supervision. In addition, by mid-February 2009, a bill was circulating in Congress to
provide federal regulation of credit default swaps.79 This is in keeping with more traditional
crisis-response practice. Still, although complex derivatives appear to have been mis-valued by
financial institutions, to their peril, none of the government regulators did anything about them in
2008.
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6. Corporate Governance. All this on-the-fly deal making even reached into areas of
corporate governance traditionally governed by state corporation law. For example, the AIG
investments were accompanied by the AIG board’s contractual commitment that it would “work
in good faith” with the investors “to ensure corporate governance arrangements satisfactory to
the Trustees.”80 More generally, an eruption of public interest in executive compensation arose,
leading regulators and Congress to impose limits on the compensation that investee companies
were allowed to pay their senior executives.81
7. Global Reach. As we will see, globalization is an important component of the more
organized models of financial regulatory reform that we consider in the next Part. It also played
a part in the on-the-fly model. The foregoing discussion of problems and responses in the US
were replicated in dozens of other countries, including the United Kingdom, most European
states, and many elsewhere around the world. By October 2008, Iceland even teetered on
national bankruptcy as a result; Denmark intervened by totally guaranteeing all inter-bank
transactions for an initial two year period. Global stock market indexes plunged, often in tandem
with declines in the US Dow, which also occurred during the 1987 stock market break.
Justifications for US intervention in many cases, especially as to Bear and AIG, included
threats to the global financial system, also an argument that supported the federal orchestration
of the rescue of LTCM in 1997. The ad hoc response to the crisis even had an official global
component, as the principals from the G20 group of countries met to discuss the crisis in
November, 2008.82 They released a statement of relatively low specificity, but one that
nonetheless underscored the global character of the crisis:
We pledge to strengthen our regulatory regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management, and
ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as
appropriate to their circumstances. We will exercise strong oversight over credit rating agencies,
consistent with the agreed and strengthened international code of conduct. We will also make
regulatory regimes more effective over the economic cycle, while ensuring that regulation is
efficient, does not stifle innovation, and encourages expanded trade in financial products and
services. We commit to transparent assessments of our national regulatory systems.83

Given this statement’s relatively vague quality, perhaps it is notable for the signal it sent
about the global nature of the crisis, rather than for specific regulatory reforms agreed to at the
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international level.84 Moreover, the ad hoc response to the 2008 crisis took on its most
substantive global tint with various Fed efforts to coordinate monetary policy with its counterpart
banks abroad. And as future financial crisis will also draw on global trends, regulatory reform
will likely be judged in part based on its global efficacy.85
__________
Back on the domestic stage, in summary, the Fed and Treasury seized upon sweeping
powers in response to the 2008 crisis. A couple of these were explicitly created by Congress
during the crisis, including legislation authorizing TARP and granting Treasury authority to seize
GSE assets. But, by and large, the agencies exercised authority in reliance on other, older
statutes, in surprising novel ways, in exercises that amounted to the achievement of financial
regulation reform.
Indeed, in addition to the powers referenced previously, the Fed and Treasury also
extended their authority when expanding support into commercial paper market markets, money
markets, asset-backed securities markets and even to bolster the financial stability of US
automobile manufacturers.86 The Fed even let the financing arm of General Motors, GMAC,
become a bank holding company, just as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had done, subject
to Fed supervision and gaining access to the Fed’s liquidity facilities.
The extent of all of this transactional activity, ranging across the financial spectrum, was
certainly novel and, as an administrative law matter, quite creative. There is some precedent, at
least internationally, and to some degree in the LTCM case, for the Fed and Treasury’s active
engagement in coordinating transactions between failed and sustainable institutions.87 But the
2008 crisis—and the merger and investment scheme used to confront it—injected the Fed into
industries it neither licensed nor in any other way regulated.
The 2008 crisis, in short, led to a “new model Fed,” one turned into something of a
financial roving commission in search of safety and soundness, no matter what the industry. It
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also placed the Treasury Department in an energetic and central role in crisis response. The
result is regulatory reform producing a vastly more centralized financial regulatory system than
the United States has had, despite no formal dismantling of the infrastructure of the traditional
fragmented model.
C. Anticipatory Preemptive Reform
We think that history helps to explain the old model and the way it has been changed, sub
silentio, during the 2008 crisis. Accordingly, we conclude our overview of the recent history of
our system of financial regulation with a historical anomaly in the timing of one of the leading
proposals for systemic reform. In past financial crises, the tendency was for regulatory and
policy analysts to study events after-the-fact, diagnose them and prescribe reform. The studies
ranged in scope and formality, from detailed exhumations to rough guesses, depending on
exigencies. But they were made in light of past events.
However, unlike in prior crises, Treasury had produced its blueprint for reform in March
2008, before it became clear to the public that a crisis was at hand, and certainly before its
severity was broadly understood. Indeed, much of the blueprint was prepared, including
predecessor study papers,88 amid comparatively calm market conditions, and released at the
beginning of a crisis, rather than at the end of it. Certainly, numerous post-crisis diagnoses and
proposals have been made,89 in keeping with traditional US responses to crises, yet the
blueprint’s early arrival remains a strikingly unusual feature of the 2008 crisis.
The blueprint preceded the 2008 crisis, is not exactly proportional or even always related
to it, and is more organized than is typical of responsive regulatory reform. As we have noted,
scholars have found a common pattern of financial crises followed by financial reform and that
pattern partly generated the fragmented model that prevailed up until the crisis of 2008.90 But
with the blueprint, Secretary Paulson appeared to want to act ahead of the crisis, to prescribe
radical change but relatively light regulation. To that extent, the blueprint can be seen as seeking
to preempt what its authors anticipated, rightly, would be calls for heavier regulation.91
The blueprint is curious in another way. Past reforms tended, overall, to be roughly
proportional to precipitating events. The stock market break of 1987 resulted in circuit breakers;
the thrift crisis in creating new agencies to replace failed ones; the LTCM rescue simply
generated increased attention to financial derivative products; and even Sarbanes-Oxley, despite
criticism for being over-reaction, provided a number of specific reforms to address specific
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diagnosed weaknesses. The blueprint, in contrast, imagined wholesale renovation of regulatory
structures along lines that, when written, would have seemed disproportionate to any manifest
urgency.
True, on some subjects, the blueprint is consistent with the principle of proportionality.
Indeed, in those instances there is an eerie sense that the blueprint anticipated substantially the
kinds of powers that, amid the crisis, the Fed, Treasury and Congress, in rapid fire, embraced.
These included how the Fed substantially expanded its use of the discount window to provide
liquidity and brought within its oversight major investment banks; other examples are how
Treasury obtained Congressional authorization for extraordinary funds to buy troubled assets, an
authority it later interpreted to include buying equity stakes in financial institutions—a practice
begun by Secretary Paulson in 2008 and continued by Secretary Geithner in 2009.
Yet on other subjects, the blueprint may be less than proportional. For example, some
obvious culprits in the 2008 crisis are not expressly addressed, including the proliferation of
unregulated credit default swaps. Should they be regulated? Many called for it during the
burgeoning crisis, and Congress proposed applicable legislation. But the blueprint has nothing to
say about it.92 Other blueprint proposals address matters that had no diagnostic role in the crisis,
such as merging the SEC and CFTC.
Implicit in these observations about the blueprint’s timing and content is a story about
when regulatory reform is possible. As Professors Ribstein and Banner have separately shown,
comprehensive reform is not something for prosperous financial times. It usually takes a crisis to
generate the will for government innovation.93 Crises contribute heavily to a felt need for
reform, which often means that crises are opportunities to enact a mixture of reform proposals
that had accumulated for years, resulting in a kitchen sink model of reform (such as that
appearing in parts of Sarbanes-Oxley).
Notably, the Paulson blueprint does not display this characteristic. Coherent and ordered,
it is atypical for crisis-generated kitchen sink style regulatory reform. Its arch-rival, contained in
the Volcker reports, displays a mixture of the coherent vision with particular responses to the
2008 crisis. The next Part explores these competing visions for planned approaches to financial
regulation.
II. ENVISIONED APPROACHES AND PLANNED STRUCTURES
The 2008 crisis certainly looks like a testimonial for the proposition that the fragmented,
industry-by-industry, regulatory model is outdated and leaves regulatory gaps that must be
closed. Moreover, the haphazard character and uncertain success of the on-the-fly response to
that crisis makes its own case for more planned out regulatory structures. The Treasury
blueprint, along with a variety of other approaches, embraces these viewpoints and radically re
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imagines unification across all financial sectors, to eliminate industry specificity and potentially
to close gaps.94
Unification the blueprint way means, ultimately, just a few senior regulators overseeing
all financial markets and institutions—and those regulators would be politically accountable.
Similar calls for concentration appear in proposals made by the Group of Thirty, though the
senior regulators would have a rather different relationship with the political branches in those
cases. The centralization prescribed by both has been echoed by a number of the testimonials of
high-ranking political officials about regulatory reform, including the Treasury Secretary.95
Because the blueprint and the Group of Thirty solutions represent the considered views of the
Republican and Democratic establishments on financial regulation, the most important aspects of
both warrant review, which this Part provides.
A. Paulson’s Blueprint: Centralize, Delegate and Compete
The blueprint’s motivations were not the 2008 crisis that widened after its release—the
blueprint was released, basically, before everything that happened in the crisis except for the
collapse of Bear Stearns. It is accordingly difficult to read the document as reflecting complete
anticipation of them. On the contrary, the blueprint says: “while functioning well, the U.S.
regulatory system is not optimal for promoting a competitive financial services sector leading the
world and supporting continued economic innovation at home and abroad.”96
The blueprint’s stated justifications for its proposals are the increasingly global capital
markets, financial innovations such as through securitizations, and convergence among different
kinds of financial institutions into large multi-line providers.97
In the widening crisis that
followed, all these forces played a role, as Part I explored, but not exactly ones the blueprint
suggests. Globalization showed interlocking systemic dependencies, not threats to US
competitiveness; securitization emerged as at least a partial cause of the problems, not a positive
development that regulation should accommodate; and convergence of financial institutions was
hastened during government orchestrated bailouts and mergers, along with substantial regulatory
concentration in the Fed and Treasury.
On the other hand, the blueprint rightly noted that the existing environment prevented any
single governmental authority to command all necessary information concerning systemic
financial risk. It attributed this limitation to regulatory fragmentation, separating functions
according to industry (banking, insurance, securities and futures). It also presciently noted that
market and/or regulatory failure in the financial sector could adversely affect the real economy.98
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As discussed below, the blueprint imagines a radical, formal overhaul of US financial regulation,
consisting of substantial federalization and unification, along with considerable delegation of
regulatory authority to self-regulatory organizations in various financial services industries. An
important motivation is to promote US capital market competitiveness globally.
1. Federalization. The blueprint’s most significant suggestion for general regulatory
authority over financial matters is formal expansion of Fed powers—pretty much those that the
Fed exercised to address the 2008 crisis. While the Fed used an ad hoc approach during the
crisis, the blueprint welcomes the centralization that the new model Fed represents.
For
example, during the crisis and for the first time since the Great Depression, in the interest of
stabilizing markets, the Fed made loans to non-depository institutions through its discount
window, the lending facility of last resort in the US. Endorsing exactly these steps, the blueprint
says this properly reflects the “fundamentally different nature of the [Fed’s] market stability
function in today’s financial markets compared to those of the past.”99
There is no doubt that this exercise of authority carried enormous systemic implications.
The blueprint opines, however, that the kind of actions that the Fed would take during the crisis
properly balanced promoting market stability with risks associated with extending federal
support to investment banks (chiefly the risk that this will encourage imprudence, a risk called
moral hazard). It suggests formally authorizing the Fed to take these steps on a more regular
basis, just as the Fed later did, although the blueprint emphasizes that doing so should be rare
and subject to conditions, which is not exactly how the new model Fed proceeded (as our
discussion in Part I suggested).
As noted, a presidential task force made similar recommendations in its report evaluating
the stock market break of October 1987.100 The blueprint’s difference turns on the way this
centralization is to be done. The blueprint specifies the availability of the discount window—the
loan-making power that the Fed relied upon to act in addressing failures at Bear Stearns and
AIG—more clearly. The blueprint provides for broad powers to open the discount window to
any who need it, but suggests that the power to lend ought to be used both judiciously, and more
generally than it has been used in the most recent emergency. The idea is that a systemic
regulator ought to act more systemically.101
The blueprint would also vest considerable new and expansive authority in the
President’s Working Group (PWG), the group created after the 1987 market break we discussed
earlier.102 The group is, if it works, an indirect form of centralization of financial regulation, and
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one without Congressional approval or oversight. It brings the diverse federal regulatory
agencies into a room heavily peopled with White House officials. We view the blueprint’s
intermediate recommendation of expanded PWG authority as an interim effort to begin its
prescribed process of centralization in the executive in an administratively easy way.
The official PWG members are: (1) the Treasury Secretary (as Chair); (2) the Fed Chair;
(3) the SEC Chair; (4) the CFTC Chair; and their respective staffs. The executive order creating
the group directed it to analyze the “major issues raised” by the 1987 market break, to determine
“the actions, including governmental actions under existing laws and regulations (such as policy
coordination and contingency planning),” that could forestall future such crises, provided that the
group would pursue “private sector solutions wherever possible.”103
Since receiving that charge, the PWG grew in size and scope, although it has never
coordinated financial regulation in the way the blueprint would have it. Its growth in size
bespeaks both its importance as a matter of regulatory coordination and in setting financial
policy. Thus, since the 1990s, in addition to the permanent members, who are conventionally
thought to be the premier financial regulators, policymakers such as the head of the President’s
National Economic Council and the Chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers,
began to attend the PWG’s meetings. Similarly, other banking regulators joined the Fed at those
meetings: the Comptroller of the Currency and the President of the New York Federal Reserve
Bank “frequently attend” Working Group sessions.104
The group also evolved from undertaking ex post diagnoses of previous failures to a more
proactive role in coordinating future regulation. The group has considered how financial
regulators can together promote investor confidence, track credit system issues (such as pursuing
on-line clearing and same-day trade comparison for all equity and derivative products), develop
effective market controls such as trading halts in emergencies and how to deal with large and
rapid unwinding of positions.105
The PWG has also considered how to more formally coordinate work—a chief goal
tasked to the PWG under the blueprint. This is not clearly a question of presidential
aggrandizement. Congress suggested in the early 1990s that the group could be used for
“coordinating the activities of the agencies amidst increasingly integrated global financial
markets.”106 The group has even been the source of some regulations.107 During the 2008 crisis,
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according to Paul Volcker’s Group of Thirty Report, the WPG “provided the backdrop for U.S.
financial supervisors to respond quickly and decisively” by fostering “ongoing and fluid
communication among regulators.”108
The blueprint proposes expanding the PWG’s powers by turning it into the short-run
locus of a consolidated financial regulatory approach through four steps:109 (1) broadening its
focus “to include the entire financial sector, rather than solely financial markets,” (2) promoting
consumer and investor protection, (3) expanding membership to formally include heads of the
Office Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC and Office of Thrift Supervision and (4) authorizing
the group to issue reports to the “President and others, as appropriate, through its role as the
coordinator of financial regulatory policy.”110
The point of this coordination is to put those with the disaggregated authority to shape
and structure financial regulation in the same room. In some ways, this amounts to nothing less
than the creation of a unified financial regulator by executive fiat, foregoing the need for often
delayed and difficult to control congressional input. It is to implement the blueprint-light, while
the executive branch awaits formal coordination promised by the actual blueprint to be
promulgated by Congress.
Apart from this short-term expansion of Fed authority and PWG power, the blueprint
introduces numerous new federal regulatory authorities. The following highlights several of the
more consequential new authorities that the blueprint envisions creating. First, the blueprint
proposes a Mortgage Origination Commission. This would have a President-appointed Director
of a 7-person board composed of designated agency heads.111 Federal legislation would create a
uniform minimum licensing scheme for state mortgage market participants and the Mortgage
Origination Commission would publish evaluative data on each state’s system implementing that
legislation. The blueprint says that this will create incentives among states to provide strong
oversight and set floors for mortgage originators.112
Under the blueprint, insurance would no longer be exclusively a state matter but a federal
matter because state regulation “makes the process of developing national products cumbersome
and more costly, directly impacting the competitiveness of U.S. insurers.”113 Accordingly, the
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blueprint proposes to establish an optional federal charter (OFC) for insurers within the existing
insurance regulation structure.114
In addition, the blueprint proposes an Office of National Insurance within Treasury to
regulate insurers using the new, optional federal charter for insurance.115 It is not obvious how
Congressional oversight would work for this arrangement, although the blueprint notes that there
was pending debate in Congress on the subject.116 Still, it also recommends creating an Office of
Insurance Oversight within the Treasury Department.117 It would have authority to address
international regulatory issues, including “authority to recognize international regulatory bodies
for specific insurance purposes.”118 Similarly, the blueprint proposes a Federal Insurance
Guarantee Fund.119 This would be run, in turn, by a Federal Insurance Guarantee Corporation,
which would be a reconstituted version of the FDIC, handling not only deposit insurance but also
insuring insurance products.120
The blueprint also recommends that the “The direct federal supervision of state-chartered
banks . . . be rationalized,” putting all such examination duties in the Fed or the FDIC.121 It
would abolish the existing separate thrift charter in favor of a single national bank charter.122
This would entail closing the Office of Thrift Supervision and transferring its power to the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency.123 Finally, under the blueprint, payment and settlement
systems that are systematically important would be federally chartered and subject to Fed
oversight, with associated federal preemption.124
In some ways, this grab bag of proposals offers some of the most striking the federal
government has ever made. They are a particular rebuke to proponents of state regulation of
business, and mark both a centralization of power and an expansion of federal regulation. States
would lose a lot of their insurance regulatory authority. The state bank counterparts to federal
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banks would also be eliminated—although it is by no means clear that state banks played any
precipitating roles in the 2008 crisis. And the mortgage and insurance regulatory powers that the
federal government would take on are entirely new.
Nonetheless, this rationalization and centralization of regulatory authority would not
happen without a role for states. The availability of state regulations and state traditions are hard
to break, as the way the blueprint’s proposed mortgage origination commission would be set up
demonstrates. That commission, after all, would cajole states and permit state regulation over
and above federal minimum standards. It is a curious exception to the general federalization of
power represented by the blueprint, but perhaps the oversight of home mortgages is something
that regulators outside of Fannie and Freddie simply cannot bring themselves to get involved
with.
Having proposed to expand executive branch power, and grow and consolidate federal
power, the blueprint also proposes extensive delegation of much of this power to self-regulatory
organizations (called SROs) in the various financial sectors being supervised.
It draws
inspiration from extensive SRO use in futures regulation by the CFTC, urges expansion of SRO
delegation by the SEC, and encourages other sectors either to create or expand such institutions
too. As one example, the blueprint proposes that Congress and the SEC converge broker-dealers
with investment advisers to harmonize regulation of participants who are “offering similar
services to retail investors.”125 It then proposes creating an SRO for investment advisers, pretty
much along lines as presently exists for broker-dealers.126
2. Unification. Beyond the foregoing short or intermediate term proposals, the blueprint
offers more sweeping views of the future in what it denominates as “the optimal structure” of US
financial regulation. Long-term, the blueprint proposes broadening the Fed’s power (or power of
something like it) even further, and creating two adjunct authorities, one to regulate financial
aspects of institutions enjoying explicit government guarantees and one to regulate the business
conduct of those and other financial institutions. In addition, the blueprint presents with limited
elaboration a corporate finance regulator, which would resemble the current SEC (after merging
with the CFTC, as the blueprint also recommends).
The blueprint sets three regulatory objectives and envisions three senior regulators to
achieve them: overall market stability by the Fed;127 financial supervision of firms with
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government guarantees by a prudential financial regulator using prevailing regulatory
philosophies;128 and protective regulation for consumers of all financial firms by a new business
conduct regulator.129 These are supplemented by two junior federal agencies charged with (a)
administering the system of explicit government guarantees and (b) supervising public securities
markets, presumably including futures markets, to encompass corporate disclosure, governance,
accounting and auditing.130
The blueprint arrives at its proposed optimal structure by eliminating alternatives:131 (1)
institutionally-based functional regulation pretty much describes the pre-crisis fragmentary
system, the chief weakness of which is that no single regulator has all information or
coordination power; (2) pure functional regulation is based on activities, the chief weakness of
which is trouble delineating activities that often overlap and assigning multiple regulators to
individual firms; and (3) a single consolidated regulator for financial and consumer protection
regulation, the chief drawback of which is it can limit synergies and reduce market innovation.
The blueprint’s proposed optimal structure overcomes these weaknesses and its chief drawback,
assuring communications between regulators, can be met, the theory goes.
The blueprint acknowledges that numerous issues are presented that it does not address,
saying it only begins to identify main ones.132 Despite this reticence, the blueprint is clear in
offering a summary of guidelines that would govern regulation throughout these agencies. First,
agencies would coordinate closely, perhaps with a coordinating body led by the Treasury
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Secretary. Second, funding would be generated by fees imposed on regulated firms, not from
general tax revenue. Third, all regulation would be governed by stated general principles:
“guidelines for regulatory process (e.g., public comment), analysis (e.g., cost-benefit analysis
and alternative analysis), and review (e.g., monitoring compliance with the principles and reports
to Congress).”133
B. Volcker’s Group of Thirty: Centralize, Control and Coordinate
If the blueprint and its ilk encourage reorganization centered in Treasury, and then, at
least in content, delegated to private industry, is there any other way to rationalize the financial
system without privatizing it? We think that there may be a slightly different alternative
available to policymakers, one developed by Democratic, rather than Republican, financial
mandarins. We caution, however, that it is not too different.
The blueprint’s optimal structure envisions three senior regulators of the financial system,
although it is essentially a two-peaked model, in which the Fed and a prudential regulator
probably rooted in Treasury are jointly responsible for systemic stability and a third senior
agency is responsible for investor and consumer protection (this agency might also be situated
within the Treasury Department). The effort to remodel financial regulation into a “twin peaks”
structure has some currency among financial policy experts, and is the remodeling achieved by
Australia in the past decade. Variations on it abound, including an even more concentrated
model that features essentially one regulatory authority, as the United Kingdom’s Financial
Services Authority.
But the blueprint’s vision is not the only way to rationalize the system. A similar sort of
regulatory analysis might be called the Volcker approach. Paul Volcker, a former Fed chair, and
the inaugural Chair of the Economic Recovery Advisory Board in the Obama Administration, led
a 2008 task force of public and private notables to opine on “The Structure of Financial
Supervision”134 Shortly thereafter, in early 2009, the group issued its more prescriptive report
called “Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability.”135
Although not nearly as detailed as Paulson’s blueprint, the Volcker proposals state
relatively clear principles and offer many specific proposals. The proposals show considerable
affinity with the Treasury blueprint, along with some subtle yet important differences in
philosophy, purpose and implementation methods. It is a potential arch-rival to the Treasury
blueprint for these reasons. Indeed, the Volcker vision might be thought of as the insider
alternative to the Paulson (himself an insider) approach. The Volcker proposals also assume that
status both because of Volcker’s role in the Obama Administration and because the drafting
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committee included Secretary Geithner, also an insider, having worked closely with Secretary
Paulson as the President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank during the 2008 crisis.
It appears that in some ways insiders think alike, as both Volcker and Paulson in their
reports express worry about globalization (albeit Volcker a bit more vigorously), exhibit an
inclination to centralize and rationalize regulatory authority, and display a substantial amount of
regard for central banks. This overlap between the Volcker and Paulson approaches is either an
indication of a reform consensus or a testament to the process by which Washington insiders
quickly learn to see things in similar ways. As we will explain, however, despite some
important points of consonance, including promoting centralization, the two differ in vital,
though perhaps subtle, ways.136
The 2008 Volcker report’s chief insight is to present a four-box menu of approaches to
financial supervision that closely resembles the similar formulation appearing in Treasury’s
blueprint.137 In the Volcker group’s view, the approaches include: institutional (where banks are
supervised by one regulator and broker-dealers by another), functional (where the regulator is
determined by the type of business being transacted—meaning that a bank like Bank of America
would be responsible to banking regulators and, regarding its newly acquired broker dealer arm
Merrill Lynch, to securities regulators); consolidated (where one regulator has responsibility
over all financial institutions), and twin-peaks (where one regulator focuses on safety-andsoundness, and the other on conduct of business).138 This menu list is a descriptive, rather than
prescriptive, accomplishment.
The 2008 Volcker report is like the Paulson blueprint in that it urges a rationalization of
the US regulatory system, which it characterizes as “somewhat dated and complex”139 and the
“exception” to the ordinary models for financial regulation prevalent elsewhere in the world.140
It essentially embraces consolidation on either a single-peaked model or twin-peaked model, as
both “more rationally reflect the changes that have taken place in the financial services business
over the past several years, and thus are widely viewed as more efficient and cost-effective by
both regulators and regulated entities.”141
The 2008 Volcker report all but fetishizes this sort of concentration, including
coordination “with the central bank,” securing the central bank’s “involvement in crisis
management.”142 It particularly urges coordination by regulators with their international
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counterparts over “systemically important global financial institutions.”143 It argues that
financial reform in the US is not impossible, observing that “a majority” of jurisdictions “are in
the process of further restructuring or are actively debating the need for significant changes to
modernize their systems” in the past 15 years.144 The authors encourage the “trend toward the
adoption of integrated regulators and towards regulation by objective.”145
Volcker’s second report, in early 2009, turns more prescriptive. It states four core
recommendations, all of which are highly re-regulatory, in contrast to the much more deregulatory framework that Treasury’s blueprint envisions. These core points are to: (1) eliminate
regulatory gaps; (2) tighten existing regulations; (3) strengthen existing governance; and (4)
heighten market transparency. Within these, Volcker’s 2009 report continues to champion
consolidation, using a one-peaked (“consolidated”) or perhaps two-peaked model, urging all
countries, including the US, to use a single national authority for oversight of important banking
institutions plus insurers, broker-dealers, money markets, private capital pools (including hedge
funds and private equity firms) and government-sponsored entities (such as in mortgage finance).
It also prescribes imposing restrictions on proprietary trading by large banks and limits on
deposit concentrations.
As for institutions themselves, the theme of the Volcker reports is promoting an
important public-sector role in safeguarding financial stability, given the “inherent volatility of
free financial markets, and the danger that volatility may occasionally reach crisis proportions
threatening economic stability.”146 Accordingly, the future of financial regulation, in Volcker’s
view, is in extending supervision over more of the financial system to governmental authorities.
The 2009 report accordingly recommends extending federal supervision over non-bank financial
institutions like insurance companies and investment banks (to the extent any may exist).
The federal agency to be created under the 2009 Volcker proposal would also oversee
money market mutual funds, reasoning that there are “dangers of institutions with no capital, no
supervision, and no safety net operating as large pools of maturity transformation and liquidity
risk.”147 The Volcker report would extend financial supervision over hedge funds, albeit
somewhat modestly. The report cites “need for greater transparency, a need for formal authority
to register and track . . . funds, in terms of size, use of leverage, risk styles, and other important
variables.”148 Certainly, this would require hedge funds to increase their disclosures about their
positions to financial regulators.149 Nonetheless, the report also recommends subjecting hedge
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funds to the possible discipline of formal regulatory authority to “reduce counterparty risk” (and
so holds open the possibility of more elaborate command-and-control regulation).
The only potentially deregulatory of the Volcker proposals involves getting the
government out of the secondary mortgage market. Institutions like Fannie and Freddie, which
are both “profit-seeking private companies and agents of government policy, ha[ve] been shown
to be unworkable over time and particularly in the midst of crises.”150 Despite that slight
ratcheting down of government’s role in finance, enterprises engaged in mortgage lending
activities would be subject to oversight of the new federal government regulatory apparatus.
As for new financial products, the Volcker 2009 report concludes that it is “imperative
that securitized and other structured product and derivative markets be held to regulatory
disclosure and transparency standards at least comparable to those that have historically been
applied to the public securities markets.”151 Concerning credit default swaps and other over-thecounter derivatives, the report urges the establishment of a “central counterparty clearing
arrangement for the credit derivatives market and coordinated efforts to greatly reduce the
growth and size of outstanding contracts through bilateral compression agreements.”152 The
goal is to reduce the size of these new markets, and to impose a “consistent regulatory
framework on an international scale over the novel financial products,” in which “national
regulators . . . share information and enter into appropriate cooperative arrangements with
authorities of other countries responsible for overseeing activities.”153
As for the form of regulation, the Volcker report embraces an important role for the
central bank in an extensively centralized regulatory edifice, which should “simplify and
consolidate overly complex structures.”154 As for regulatory content, the report evinces a
preference for principles over rules.155
Volcker’s 2009 report also urges particular substantive changes, on subjects not only of
concern to traditional central banks and banking supervisors. Certainly, the proposals call for
enhancing capital requirements and ratios, and liquidity risk requirements, and assuring that a
mechanism to resolve failing institutions exists. The report also says that credit rating agencies
should be compensated for risk analyses on a different payment model than they have used in the
past.156 They urge improving fair value accounting and promoting the flexibility of accounting
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standards generally.157 This includes a specific endorsement of mark to market accounting for
“trading activities and most elements of market risk.”158 The Volcker 2009 report also ventures
beyond any manifest elements of the 2008 crisis by recommending strengthening corporate
board governance to improve risk management, executive compensation oversight, and auditing
functions.159
The Volcker reports emphasize need for regulatory authorities to be independent.
Although not specific, this may suggest that, within the US, the Volcker reports imagine the
newly-consolidated regulatory power to be reposed in one or two independent federal agencies.
This implication thus differs sharply from the blueprint’s prescription to put this power under the
President’s control along with considerable delegation of authority to self-regulatory
organizations.
Above all, as with Volcker’s 2008 report, its 2009 recommendations strongly emphasize
the need for international approaches—and, in particular, international coordination. The
Volcker reports embrace international cooperation as a solution to prudent oversight amid
increasingly global financial markets. For example, the reports suggest that “Prudential
regulators in central banks should collaborate with international agencies in an effort to define
leverage,” and ultimately limit it. It admits concerns about capital adequacy, naturally enough,
given that the largest institutions during the crisis appeared to be—much to their surprise—
substantially undercapitalized.
These views provide an interesting contrast between the Volcker report and Paulson’s
Treasury blueprint. While the Paulson blueprint pushed globalization as a reason for regulatory
reform, the Volcker report characterizes it as part of the solution. Volcker’s 2008 report pins
high hopes for “colleges of supervisors”—that is, regulatory authorities from different
jurisdictions who oversee the same multinational enterprise, and do so in a coordinated way.160
Indeed, “international groupings [such as the informal networks represented by the Basle
Committee and IOSCO] . . . need to be supplemented by colleges that facilitate communication
between home and host supervisors in normal times so as to prepare the lines of communication
for times of systemic crises.”161
This focus on international coordination and control differs from the blueprint’s
engagement with globalization, which seems more intended to promote US competiveness in
global capital markets than a way to impose order on them. Indeed, while both the Paulson and
Volcker visions imagine substantial federalization and consolidation of regulatory power over
wide ranging financial institutions, markets and products, they appear to do so for different
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reasons. These differences, and further contrasts with how both differ from the pre-existing
structure and the developed-on-the-fly system forged by the 2008 crisis, entice the following
framework for choosing among these three or four approaches to financial regulation.
III. CHOOSING AMONG APPROACHES
Our three or four models of financial regulation take different views on centralized versus
decentralized government, the place of the executive branch in administrative law, and even the
place of states and self-regulators in financial law. In this Part, we evaluate the implications of
each of these approaches on these areas. In the end, while we understand the impetus for reform,
we register a note of caution. Centralization and rationalization along the Paulson and Volcker
models seems sensible, and certainly has been practiced, to some degree, in 2008 and 2009. But
we think the unlovely older system had its advantages that should not be overlooked—
redundancy has its uses, and so does regulatory competition.
As debate, Congress, and the executive branch turn away from the old way of doing
things, we think that there is a serious risk that they may abandon some of the useful values of
the old system. We also think that there is more to the usefulness of the old system than appears
to meet the current eye. While if there must be reform, we lean towards the values of expertise,
global cooperation, and the like embodied by the Volcker approach, we do not hew too closely to
any of the centralization proposals—at least not if, ultimately, they put all the regulatory eggs in
one putatively super-competent basket.
The Treasury blueprint offers, as we have explained, an approach to regulation that turns
first on a centralization of power, and second on a delegation of that power to industry. The
centralization would manifest itself in two ways; it flows to the federal government, and away
from the states, and, within the federal government, to the Treasury Department and the
President, and away from independent agencies like the SEC and, at least partly, even the Fed.
Maximal delegation to self-regulatory organizations would follow. An important goal seems to
be to promote US international capital market competitiveness.
The Volcker approach, although offering less detail or prescription, likewise envisions a
planned, centralized and substantially unified approach to regulatory reform and resulting
regulatory structures. But both Volcker reports seem to vest resulting federal authority in
independent agencies, not in the executive branch under the President’s control, and are
motivated more by a desire to establish international regulatory control over global capital
markets rather than to encourage or promote competition across national markets.
These paired proposals, then, although in very different ways, both would radically alter
the indisputably creaky current approach. The current system relies on an incongruous blend of
state supervision in some cases, while in others it depends on federal supervision divided by
specific industry, and sometimes by various issue areas within an industry—say, local banks
regulated by states, national banks regulated by the Fed and Treasury, and all federally insured
banks, whether state or federally chartered, subject to the discipline imposed by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.162
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The Volcker I report found the old American approach to be so idiosyncratic as to mark
the United States as the “exception” to the world’s financial regulatory approaches.163 As we
explained in Part I, there is no question that the pre-crisis system evolved through path
dependency and a reactive, crisis-driven, rather than systematic, approach to financial
regulation.164 But that does not mean that it is without its attractions. The system kept
regulators on their toes through regulatory competition, and yet permitted regulators to act
substantively, through litigation, formal rules-based regulation, and informal principles
oversight. Small patchwork fixes to this system, such as assuring some regulatory authority over
credit default swaps, may be both politically feasible and appropriately cautious.165
In any event, the blueprint and Volcker reports are unusual in other respects. The
blueprint proposes the most radical reorganization of financial regulation since the Great
Depression. The Volcker reports are likewise bold. How should we make sense of these? The
blueprint’s proposed reorganization is, we think, meant to pursue two broad themes, one
procedural and one philosophical. Both bear specific, mostly unstated, substantive implications,
some of which are clear and immediate while others are inchoate and potential. Contrasting
implications flow from the Volcker proposals.
First, procedurally, the blueprint embodies a new vision of the bureaucracy as a creature
to be tamed and supervised by the President—and no one else.166 This means a consolidation of
power in the federal government rather than states. It involves reposing that power in the
executive branch rather than in Congress. The vision then concentrates that power in the office
of the President and the cabinet secretaries removable by him or her at will, rather than
distributing it through independent agencies like the SEC and the Fed. After this amassing of
power, the executive would delegate it, to the extent feasible, to self-regulatory organizations in
the various industries.
The Volcker proposals, in contrast, while also contemplating a radical reorganization,
seem to follow the more traditional approach of using independent federal agencies, which are in
turn more responsive to Congress, rather than reposing extensive power in the President and
executive branch. The 2008 Volcker report calls for a “system in which those responsible for
prudential regulation and supervision have a high degree of political and market independence,”
and emphasize a “need to ensure the political and market independence of national regulatory
authorities.”167 That would rule out giving plenary power to the President and his cabinet
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appointees, as the blueprint contemplates (and, indeed, as the on-the-fly approach to the crisis of
2008 reflected).
The reason for the different approaches seems to lie, in part, in competing understandings
of political pressures that can be brought to bear against regulators during financial crises. While
the Paulson blueprint centralizes the response to crises in politically accountable officials in the
Treasury Department, the Volcker approach, consistent with a long line of scholarship
suggesting that central banking is best done independently from the political process, prefers
insulating decision makers as remotely as possible from such political accountability and
pressure.168 Furthermore, the Volcker reports evince no or little enthusiasm for expanded use of
self-regulatory organizations so exuberantly championed in the blueprint.
Second, philosophically, the blueprint would make this presidentially-controlled financial
scheme into a deregulatory enterprise. Despite consolidation of regulatory power in the federal
government, the vision is to delegate much of that authority in turn to self-regulatory
organizations. This deregulatory impulse is also reflected in the blueprint’s strategic timing,
issued at the onset of crisis whose widening a year later produced calls for greater regulation,
making for a dialogue that required engaging with the blueprint as a baseline alternative. The
philosophy is manifested in a move from the relative clarity of administrative rules to a vaguer
principles approach that is comparatively opaque and committed to discretion.
The blueprint’s philosophy entails heavier focus on minimums of safety and soundness
for financial institutions, than on traditional investor or consumer protection that U.S. financial
regulators are best known for. This reflects a particular view of the purposes of financial
regulation, concentrating on systemic stability—and American competitiveness—rather than
constituent protection, with minimal standards of prudential oversight and business conduct or
corporate disclosure.
The Volcker proposals also evince a preference for principles to rules and offer at least
some gestures of a deregulatory nature, such as withdrawing the federal government from the
mortgage finance business. But the Volcker proposals recommend a more substantive regulatory
philosophy than the Treasury blueprint. They imagine specific substantive limits on institutional
size and trading activities. They imagine specific regulation of financial products. They imagine
specific ways to regulate rating agency compensation and even weigh in on accounting debates
and matters of corporate governance like board performance and executive compensation. The
role of independence for domestic regulators and global coordination for the Volcker group are
hard to overstate. Volcker emphasizes: markets have “become international in scope,” but this is
not a reason to compete—instead “efforts to reregulate them” are best approached “on a
coordinated basis.”169
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Many implications follow from the striking similarities coupled with subtle differences
between these two grand visions. Although it may be possible, and desirable, to conduct a
specific proposal-by-proposal dissection and selection between them, we think these broad
procedural and philosophical differences provide a more productive general way to think about
the approaches, to assess their competing implications, and to compare these with those of the
prevailing approaches, before and since the 2008 crisis.
Framed this way, two themes warrant the special attention supplied in the following
framework and evaluation. The first theme, which Section A explores, concerns a longstanding
debate among administrative lawyers about what to make of the independent agencies that the
blueprint would eliminate, in favor of executive branch control, followed by delegation to
industry groups. In this view, the independence of regulators is a problem that the financial
crisis presents an opportunity to solve. The Volcker approach, on the other hand, appears more
likely to welcome regulatory independence, and appears less sure about the value of delegation
to private industry. The 2008 Volcker report contends that “the time has also come to move
beyond moral suasion and enlightened market self interest” to create a comprehensive regulatory
scheme.170
The second theme, which Section B explores, concerns a longstanding debate in
regulatory theory about the relative merits of regulatory competition, which Paulson’s blueprint
and Volcker reports both could reduce, versus regulatory monopoly, which they could create or
increase. The blueprint seems to embrace consolidation of US regulatory authority in large part
to project US capital market competiveness onto a global stage where other nations likewise
compete. The Volcker reports suggest embracing such consolidation domestically with a further
view to achieve similar consolidation at the global level. The fragmented pre-crisis model
rested significantly upon notions of regulatory competition and the on-the-fly quasi-concentrated
model that now exists is a non-trivial challenge to those notions.
Finally, Section C considers political realities confronting both these visions. To be
sustainable, the Volcker vision requires the international community’s will and capacity to
collaborate as expected. Both visions depend on the assumption that domestic regulatory
concentration is politically feasible and sustainable. Neither prospect seems highly likely. The
upshot may be that the most probable, and possibly appealing, approach to financial regulation is
remnants of the traditional fragmented model, as modified during 2008, plus incremental reforms
taken from the otherwise grand visions laid out by Messrs. Paulson and Volcker.
A. Administrative Law
As a matter of administrative law, Paulson and Volcker’s formal centralizing proposals
for regulation roundly reject the old, disaggregated model; Paulson’s blueprint may vindicate
those theorists who support presidential control over decision-making; and both raise some
questions about the future of preemption in this vigorous and federalized area. We consider the
administrative law implications of the approaches to financial regulation by focusing on the
blueprint. The blueprint’s proposed reorganization both federalizes and centralizes financial
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regulation is unusual in the degree of power concentrated within the executive branch of the
federal government, to the point where the structure of financial regulation would change.
Before, that regulation has been conducted by agencies that have always existed outside the
executive branch—the SEC, CFTC, and, to some degree, the Fed.171 The President cannot fire
the heads of these agencies absent cause (which in practice has meant that they are not fired at
all), and the agencies are run by a balanced set of Republican and Democratic appointees.172
But under the blueprint, these agencies would be replaced by new regulators with less
obvious independence. In the interim, financial policy would be set by an inter-agency working
group chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, and not subject to many of the usual constraints
on bureaucratic power, such as open government, and even judicial review.173 Ultimately,
moreover, the powers of the Treasury Department would grow under the new regime, as the
PWG were folded into the new, Treasury-controlled regulators that would supersede the SEC
and much of the Fed. The President’s control over financial regulation would also grow.
Treasury, of course, is in the heart of the executive branch, and led by secretaries who serve at
the will of the president. These officials can be, and often are, fired by the President.174
The blueprint thus marks a move away from independence and towards executive branch
control. Executive control over agency decision-making is something that administrative
lawyers have been thinking carefully about since Elena Kagan made the case for such control
after serving in the Clinton White House for seven years.175 To Kagan, executive authority over
administration in general is all for the best. She approvingly concluded, in a well-known article,
that a contemporary president should “treat[] the sphere of regulation as his own.”176
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This means that he should “convert[] administrative activity into an extension of his own
policy and political agenda.”177 In Kagan’s view, this can lead to “enhanced government”
through “executive[] vigor.”178 She is not alone in her enthusiasm. Steven Croley has concluded
that the White House is and, it is argued, should be, a principle source of bureaucratic
initiative.179 Other scholars believe that Presidential power “inevitably expands,” and that this is
no bad thing.180 Skeptics exist, of course. For example, Thomas Sargentich characterized the
most awe-inspired and enthusiastic of the “presidentialists” as proponents of a “Presidential
mystique.”181
The Bush administration did much to prove the descriptive part of Kagan’s hypothesis
accurate. It did so in the war on terror in particular, under which essentially every government
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agency, and many state and local ones too, were pressed into a quintessentially executive sort of
service—and concomitantly within the ambit of executive supervision.182 Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermuele have concluded that the presidentialism of the war on terror has also
characterized the prominence of the executive in responding to the financial crisis.183
But until Treasury’s blueprint, no executive had proposed turning large, famous, and old
independent agencies into executive branch subordinates before. Nor has the coordination of the
actions of financial regulators proceeded along quite so novel administrative processes.184
Moreover, the blueprint does more than just centralize power. It also would extend regulatory
supervision over any remaining investment banks, and perhaps even hedge funds. It would move
the federal government into the regulation of insurance carriers and extensively curtail enduring
state roles in banking law.
In this, the Volcker approach is quite duplicative, and the urge to rationalize and
nationalize is strong in both the Democratic and Republican versions of financial reform. The
difference in the centralization between the two approaches lies in the independence of the
regulators to whom centralization would be entrusted; with Volcker, the independence of the
regulator is particularly important, whereas with the Paulson blueprint, the idea is to consolidate
regulatory power in the executive branch under Presidential control, which is pretty much where
it resided after the on-the-fly responses to the crisis in both 2008 and 2009.
Finally, this federal centralization, especially in the blueprint but also in the Volcker
proposals, raises federal preemption issues, because they represent the federalization of so much
of our decentralized financial regulatory architecture. This is especially true of the blueprint
because, by creating so many new federal institutions, it raises the prospect that those institutions
would preempt state regulation of finance, including banking, insurance, futures and securities,
even if Congress does not provide for preemption in its reform bill. Similar consequences could
follow from implementing changes that the Volcker proposals contemplate, and these could even
easily reach into subjects such as corporate board performance and executive compensation that
traditionally have been treated as part of state corporation law.
The idea that federal law might preempt state law is unsurprising to anyone with a
passing familiarity with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. But when, exactly, the
federal government has preempted state law is lately an increasing preoccupation of the Supreme
Court. Congress does not always explicitly express its desire to preempt all state law in a sphere
of federal regulation with clarity. This reticence puts courts in the difficult position of deciding
whether the legislature silently intended to displace state rules, usually by enabling a federal
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agency to regulate in the area.185 Because the objectives of this sort of federal statutory scheme
might be frustrated by enforcement of state law, a court may also find the state law preempted.186
Agency-driven preemption cases arise in a variety of contexts, but often arise when
federal consumer protection or safety standards conflict with state tort law.187 The Supreme
Court has recently shown increasing willingness to conclude that federal law does preempt state
tort law in these cases, particularly if a federal regulatory agency supports that stance. There are,
of course, exceptions, such as the recent decision in Wyeth Pharmaceuticals v. Levine, where the
Court decided against state tort law preemption.188
Still, as Catherine Sharkey has noted, the Supreme Court almost always sides with the
federal agency when the preemption of state law by federal regulation comes before it.189
Accordingly, there is a prospect that the new, central, and powerful institutions envisioned by the
blueprint, and perhaps those required to implement the Volcker proposals, could see their ambit
to require regulations that they would conclude should preempt state law—and that federal
courts could agree with them.
B. Regulatory Theory
Administrative law differences aside, it may be difficult to imagine consolidating into
just a few federal agencies the traditional and varying functions performed by the Fed, other
federal and state banking authorities, the various state insurance regulators and the SEC and
CFTC. Admittedly, federal government agencies are both created and terminated from time to
time and no agency’s permanent survival can be taken for granted.190 Yet such large-scale
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reorganizations of numerous agencies simply have not happened in the administrative state, at
least not since the Great Depression.191
But assuming for the moment that the political will exists, what are the implications of a
reorganization of financial regulation that extensively consolidates power in Washington—in
banking, insurance, futures and securities certainly—and possibly, as some suggestions in the
Volcker reports signal, for cognate fields as wide-ranging as corporation law? How would the
implications of the blueprint and the Volcker proposals differ from each other? Finally, how
would either compare to the traditional fragmented approach or the quasi-centralized approach as
it exists after the Fed and Treasury’s on-the-fly reforms amid the 2008 crisis?
As a matter of regulatory theory, proponents of the principles of experimentation and
regulatory competition might not welcome the centralization of either the Paulson or Volcker
proposals. True, the prevailing US fragmentary system of financial regulation is, as we have
explained, not a particularly coherent one. But it also offers recognizable virtues. Chief among
these is the application of divided government to financial regulation.
Believers in a Madisonian vision of divided government may be inclined to keep the
financial regulatory system in the form closely resembling the current one (whether or not treated
as modified by the 2008 crisis-response centralization). Divided government slows down the
ability of new visionaries (which may include Messrs. Paulson and Volcker) with a
comprehensive approach to regulation to implement that vision. And there are those who believe
that this would be no bad thing, such as, for example, those persuaded by the Burkean
advantages of making change difficult.192
Proponents of decentralized experimentalism, such as Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf,
might have additional reasons to prefer the relative disunity of the current system, or something
that looks like it.193 On this view, it is desirable that the CFTC and SEC oversee markets that do
similar things, because it creates something of a market for law. Dispersion of regulatory
authority creates incentives for competing authorities to engage in experimentation.
Consolidation of regulatory authority would alter those incentives. It is not clear that
experimentation could occur under a centralized financial regulator, even if that regulator
delegated considerable standard-setting authority to private self-regulatory organizations, as
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visions like the blueprint contemplate, and certainly seems unlikely under the centralization that
the Volcker reports contemplate.
The optimal balance between state and federal regulation, and corresponding
fragmentation or consolidation, is an issue in substantially all fields of financial regulation
implicated in the blueprint and Volcker reports. In banking, consider capital adequacy
regulations, a fundamental tool intended to promote the safety and soundness of banks. A global
standard for this tool appears in the Basel II Capital Accord.194 In the United States, different
regulators embraced the global standard in various measures. The Federal Reserve, the FDIC,
Treasury, and even the SEC each took tailored approaches to capital adequacy of the institutions
they supervised. Some adopted the tool slowly or in tranches or even made adoption of it by
certain institutions voluntary.
A potentially appealing result of this fragmentation of authority is a palette of options for
participants in financial markets. It also promotes a close fit between regulatory expertise and
the targeted firms. Of course, there are also costs to this disharmony. For example, there is
reason to believe that the SEC’s adaptation of the Basel II Capital Accord from commercial
banking to investment banking failed to appreciate the different capital structures and business
operations of the two types of institutions. In addition, the many federal and state banking
regulators have made bank operation excessively highly paper-intensive task. They have
complicated the banking sector’s efforts to create common international supervisory standards.
These costs may increase amid globalization. Consider insurance. The fact that insurance
supervision in the United States is managed by the 50 states has been one reason why efforts to
harmonize insurance regulation internationally have gone much less far than parallel efforts to
harmonize banking supervision standards and even securities regulation, especially in the area of
accounting.195 Although insurance companies have not hesitated to expand operations widely
and deeply around the globe, oversight of them has not followed. Even if the regulatory discensus and gaps in insurance were deemed desirable, it results not from any conscious national
decision but is a haphazard result of the fragmented National Association of Insurance
Commissioners’ inability to coordinate internationally.
Scholarly debate on federalism and regulatory theory has been particularly vibrant in the
context of securities regulation and its cognate field of corporation law. Since the days of Ralph
Winter, scholars have found some value in the fragmented approach to regulation, especially in
corporation law.196 To some, like Roberta Romano, fragmentation makes it possible for small,
fee dependent regulators to be responsive—indeed more responsive—to the interests of the
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regulated industry than would the federal government (and this is seen as desirable).197 To
many, fragmentation can lead to a race to the regulatory top, where the best regulatory policies
are forced to prove themselves in a 50 state market for law.
Opponents object that through regulatory rent-seeking198 or managerial power, the result
becomes a race to the bottom.199 More agnostic are those scholars who doubt the efficacy of
any such competition leading to any particular or predictable results.200 Despite longstanding
debate over state competition in corporate law, including whether it is to the top or to the bottom,
in recent years, that competition abated considerably.201 Delaware won, with some newfound
competition for it from Washington replacing erstwhile state competitors. This occurs primarily
when Congress uses or threatens to use federal securities regulation to enact laws that intrude
into subjects traditionally seen to be within state corporation law, as with Sarbanes-Oxley.202
Federal corporate regulation preempts state law, however, meaning the potential for
federal monopoly that can result in inefficient laws. To address that concern, proponents of state
competition in corporate law adapted its insights to the federal securities regulation context.203
They propose devices to overcome that monopoly by creating avenues for regulatory competition
among jurisdictions worldwide Leading examples are to give securities issuers the choice of
applicable laws;204 give stock exchanges where issuers list that choice;205 or offer “substituted
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compliance” (also called mutual recognition), which lets foreign entities regulated comparably at
home access securities markets abroad without regulation there.206 Although the desirability of
such proposals can be questioned,207 there is less doubt about their feasibility given global stock
market competition.208
In fact, when United States capital markets were among the only places to raise large
amounts of capital, US federal securities regulation may have been a functional monopoly. But
of late, stock exchange competition, and accompanying regulatory oversight, intensified amid
globalization and technology changes.209 There are now dozens of vibrant capital markets in the
world, all vying with each other to attract capital. These markets and regulators compete with
one another, breaking the erstwhile US federal monopoly.210 Choice of law devices may not
even be necessary to enable national markets and related regulatory oversight to compete on a
global basis.211
The blueprint and Volcker reports respond to such global developments in different ways.
True, both would take large strides towards ending the state role in financial regulation and
substantially consolidate it in the federal government. The blueprint explicitly contemplates
doing so for traditional state insurance and banking, and maintaining and unifying federal
regulatory authority over securities and futures. Although not explicit, the blueprint’s logic even
allows for consolidation of federal authority over state corporation law,212 and the Volcker
reports refer to the need to increase corporate board governance generally, and especially in the
areas of executive compensation and financial reporting.213 Both also raise the prospect of the
preemption of state law in all these fields, something that federal regulators and courts, as we
noted, have increasingly interpreted their statutory responsibilities to require.214
To that extent, the blueprint and Volcker proposals may seem to promote federal
regulatory monopoly that could result in inefficient laws. But the grand visions part ways in
their respective responses to globalization and resulting global regulatory competition. The
blueprint seeks to promote US capital market competitiveness, consolidating oversight in
Washington but adopting a relatively loose supervisory approach with considerable delegation to
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industry self-regulators. This attempts to put US financial firms, and the US federal regulatory
apparatus, in a favorable competitive position with other nations. In effect, the blueprint first
concentrates US financial regulation using a consolidated federal structure and then embraces
global fragmentation among competing national structures participating in global competition.
These implications of the blueprint entail a re-conception of federalized financial
regulation that would essentially reverse contending stances in regulatory theory debates.
Proponents of federal financial regulation have urged it as an antidote to state law’s perceived
laxity. Opponents express concern about how resulting regulatory monopoly may yield
inefficient laws. But if the US federal regulatory monopoly in securities regulation is abating,
and global regulatory competition intensifying, then risk of inefficient laws from US regulatory
monopoly declines. So the blueprint sides with those otherwise averse to federal regulatory
monopoly by using it to embrace global regulatory competition and committing the US to
succeed in it.
In contrast, the Volcker reports implicitly side with those favoring federal regulatory
monopoly precisely to provide mandatory controls in financial regulation. The Volcker vision is
to make US capital markets sound and its real economy stable. It consolidates oversight in
Washington, using a substantive regulatory philosophy with limitations like caps on the size of
financial institutions or businesses they can pursue. It responds to globalization not by
embracing competition but by seeking collaboration. The quest for domestic concentration
coupled with international collaboration addresses concern that, if the US federal regulatory
monopoly abates, free global competition may spell lax regulation. A global regulatory
monopoly is sought.
C. Political Reality
These normative distinctions between Paulson’s blueprint and the Volcker reports raise
additional matters that turn more political and practical. We are not sure that wholesale
centralization is realistic, and so our assessments of the grand visions posit that they must
contend with prospects for their sustainability. For the Volcker approach, this requires attention
to whether the envisioned global coordination among nations is feasible. For both, it requires
considering whether the envisioned domestic concentration is achievable and sustainable.
Already, there is some support for turning any form of consolidated regulation into regulation by
committee, where extant regulators coordinate approaches more carefully. This “National
Director of Intelligence” approach for financial markets appears to represent centralization more
in name than in fact.
The Volcker vision sees extensive collaboration among national regulators in a large
number of countries who will not only agree to share information but also coordinate on setting,
maintaining and enforcing agreed regulations of financial markets. Although there is some
modest support for such a prospect in certain discrete contexts, such as the Basel Accords, and
some progress evident in converging of international accounting standards, it is not obvious that
the requisite coordination for broad financial regulation will occur or be sustainable.215
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In times of economic crisis, such as during 2008, there may be greater willingness among
nations to join together, even to sign cooperation agreements and join periodic communiqués,
such as the G20 overture cited earlier.216 Yet crisis also can induce national leaders to
concentrate more intensively on domestic affairs and interests,217 even among members of
otherwise successful economic blocs, such as the European Union.218 It is difficult to predict
international propensity toward regulatory cooperation during periods of economic expansion,
particularly considering how the globalization of finance and related competition is a relatively
recent phenomenon.
Cold comfort appears in various initiatives to develop bilateral and multi-lateral
platforms to coordinate undertakings among financial regulators from different countries.219 A
main example is the SEC’s developing mutual recognition program.220 Despite much fanfare,
the SEC has formally entered into only one such agreement, with Australia, concerning only one
such participant, brokers. Furthermore, even the considerable SEC and international cooperation
and convergence that has been achieved concerning international accounting standards is beset
with hold-outs and disagreement.221 In part, this reflects extensive variation among nations in
legal origins, and historical, political, sociological and economic orientations towards capital
markets, securities investment, corporate governance and the roles of markets and the state in
national affairs.222
The appetite for international coordination in financial market and regulation matters is
constrained by inherent national interests to promote capital markets and financial industries
domestically.223 There is ongoing and increasing regulatory competition among national
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securities regulators, operating in part and indirectly through their stock exchanges.224 That
competition is mediated, but only slightly, by efforts to harmonize regulation that IOSCO and
entities like it have made.225
Despite occasional signs of mild collusion among national regulators, this may simply
reveal that it is necessary to engage with one another, and this often means competing to attract
capital to their home markets. These limitations may diminish prospects for the kind of
regulatory collaborations that the Volcker plan would need and, without them, the Volcker
vision’s stringent regulatory impositions could put the United States at a competitive
disadvantage internationally. 226
That remains true despite occasional expressions of
international unity, amid the 2008 crisis, when certain countries long deemed to be out of step
with international financial regulatory norms got into step.227
Unlike the Volcker vision, the Paulson vision essentially assumes that such international
collaborations are unlikely to result in sustainable consensus. Even so, both plans must confront
domestic political realities, and practical limitations, on their shared visions for concentration of
regulatory authority within the US. Here, there is reason to doubt whether a truly concentrated
regulatory structure, such as a two-peaks model, is sustainable in the United States. The
blueprint nearly acknowledges as much, despite proclaiming need for a “modern” regulatory
structure to reflect “convergence of the financial services industry.” In the same discussion of
such perceived convergence, it explicitly recognizes different enterprise business models and
different government interaction with enterprises.
For example, the blueprint notes that “the requirements for financial capacity and
managerial expertise should vary by type of financial product being sold.”228 It distinguishes
consumer/retail transactions from business/wholesale transactions and distinguishes firms with
government guarantees from those without them. It recognizes differences between securities
and futures firms, even though it recommends having them supervised by a single agency. It
distinguishes these firms from banks and insurers, which are also acknowledged to be different
kinds of institutions. The customers of all these firms have different needs and related
regulations probably should reflect them. That means inherent fragmentation. Nothing in the
Volcker proposals counters these realities.
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Furthermore, the vaunted two-peaks model endorsed by both visions may not have
proven its mettle. These and other proponents invariably mention that numerous other nations
have moved to the two-peaks model in the past decade, including the United Kingdom. Yet the
2008 crisis rocked the financial markets and many specific financial institutions in those
countries at least as severely as in the United States. This certainly gives reason to wonder
whether any regulatory authority, no matter how centralized, ever could be in a position to
become aware of excessively concentrated systemic risk. It does not mean there isn’t value to the
structure or the quest, but experience does not demonstrate superiority of the two-peaks model
compared to alternatives, including the battle-tested traditional fragmented US approach.
Accordingly, it is not clear the blueprint’s ordered coherence or the Volcker reports’
coherent ambitions will help their kind of centralization to triumph over contenders, including
remnants of the traditional fragmented system as changed by the new model Fed’s on-the-fly
responses to the 2008 crisis. The on-the-fly approach appeared to reinvigorate the President’s
Working Group; it is possible that political realities of transforming multiple regulators into a
putative single regulator would stop at the regulation-by-committee form that the PWG
resembles.229 Although the resulting quasi-concentration’s sustainability cannot be assured, its
accomplishment attests to at least some staying power. In any event, the de facto reform remains
less sweeping than that imagined under either the Paulson or Volcker visions.
We believe that a superior resolution will be achieved by recognizing that many reforms
in both the blueprint and Volcker proposals can proceed piecemeal. Within the grand visions
that each elaborate, appear a grab bag of discrete proposals that can be selectively adopted,
following the traditional crisis-response approach to US financial regulation. For example,
Congress could accept the blueprint’s recommendation for a federal Mortgage Origination
Commission and enact an optional federal insurance charter; following Volcker’s prescriptions,
it could pass legislation to regulate credit default swaps and, by legislation or direction to the
SEC, increase regulatory supervision of rating agencies.
We believe reforms such as these offer a more sensible and pragmatic response to the
events we have catalogued. After all, what are the prospects for adoption of either of these grand
visions or any of the discrete reforms that each contains? Although we disclaim political
scientific expertise, the content of reform post-crisis depends on a number of factors that turn a
bit more on political economy than on law. For example, although it raises the possibility of
capture, recognized in public choice theory, industry support does help to overcome the status
quo bias of both regulators and the legislature.230
We have seen some evidence of this, including a number of tacit bows to the coming
regulatory expansion, ranging from apparent acquiescence of hedge funds to some degree of
oversight, to the willingness of senior bank officials to accept bailout largesse—even at the cost
of their own executive compensation. One reason for crisis-generated reform may be consistent
with another strand of public choice theory: it takes events of widespread consequence to
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motivate poorly engaged and disaggregated majorities to re-examine institutionalized regulatory
schemes, which between crises are likely to be responsive to more easily organized minorities.231
Amid the 2008 crisis, political sensibilities undoubtedly galvanized and possibly shifted.
The blueprint’s deregulatory posture, along with delegation, was offered essentially pre-crisis,
when appetites had been building for several years, after Sarbanes-Oxley, for just such a
deregulatory commitment. Its origins are in a series of reports lamenting a decline in US capital
market competiveness.232 It is a call to reform that, in that pre-crisis period, may have enjoyed
considerable political traction, certainly among market devotees and perhaps commanding
appeal across wide parts of the center of the political spectrum.
While market purists may yet prefer a blueprint type of approach that embraces global
regulatory competition, more vocal advocates of regulation’s virtues, and a wide swath across
the political center, may be prepared to embrace the more controlled regulatory vision set out in
the Volcker reports. Even so, when a triggering event inspires reform and even generates
requisite political will to make change, the event and the reform are not always closely connected
to each other, as Part I illustrated.233 These political and practical realities may point toward
following America’s more traditional response to crisis of targeted incremental reform rather
than pursuing the more sweeping visions offered by Paulson’s blueprint or the Volcker reports.
Still, those alternatives do appear to constitute the range of realistic possibilities and
principal approaches ahead. We believe, as we have said, that incremental rather than
revolutionary reform is the more prudent and pragmatic approach.
CONCLUSION
Proposed reforms in light of the 2008 crisis are certainly sweeping. The Paulson
blueprint calls for the alteration or disbandment of federal governmental agencies that have been
around for a century, and the Volcker plan echoes those calls. The Fed was created in 1913 and
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1933.234 The Federal government got involved with
futures regulation with the 1922 Grain Futures Act, and established thrift oversight in the 1932
Federal Home Loan Bank Act.235 The McCarran-Ferguson Act, which formally delegated
authority to establish insurance laws to states, dates to 1945. Reform under either grand vision
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would mean that these agencies and statutes be replaced, in whole or in part, with a new set of
laws and financial regulators that would have very different responsibilities.
Under both
Paulson and Volcker proposals, broad supervisory responsibilities would be consolidated in one
or two senior federal regulators.
To some, of course, financial reform, like much of corporate regulation, is not so
important, and grand visions like these may be mere visions.236 When the Paulson blueprint was
first mooted, moreover, some observers thought that its recommendations did not amount to
much. Economist Paul Krugman, a member of the Volcker report team, sniffed “To hide their
lack of any actual ideas about what to do, managers sometimes make a big show of rearranging
the boxes and lines that say who reports to whom.”237 The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board
quipped that “No bureaucratic deck chair goes unmoved” under the plan, and otherwise exhibited
little interest in its substance.238
This sort of early dismissal, and the regulatory triviality argument more generally, is
curious in light of what has happened since Treasury first mooted widespread reform. Since then,
the United States federal government devoted some $500 billion to bailing out the financial
system, which collapsed in a way that rendered investment banking as we knew it, extinct,
drastically altered the structure of commercial banking and mortgage finance and caused severe
hardship in the real economy.
Despite early dismissal, since its release, the blueprint has garnered considerable, and as
the crisis widened, escalated, attention. The Volcker group’s reports, commanding equal
interest, address some of the same territory directly. One describes the blueprint as “farreaching,” and says that the “fact that Treasury has put these proposals on the public agenda,
together with the seriousness of current conditions, suggests that there will be an active debate”
on approaches to financial regulation.239
The increasing focus on bold reform to concentrate regulatory authority should be taken
seriously but cautiously. After all, our evaluation suggests some enduring merits of the
traditional US fragmented approach and the accomplishment of extensive reforms to it that
significantly concentrated the structure of US financial regulation. Additional concentration may
not be necessary and may in any event prove unsustainable. A grab bag of reform ideas appears
in the otherwise grand visions for planned centralized reforms. Adopting some of those would
follow an American tradition of crisis response, using its traditional fragmented system. In any
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event, one of these three or four approaches to financial regulation seems destined to become the
approach we take into the next crisis—and perhaps to pull us out of the current one.
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